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The Case for Idealism

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The Case for Idealism
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Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

It appears he missed my email in the blizzard of them he gets daily. I've the conversation thread to him now.


Alright then the email is still suspect. Awaiting verification.

That we can't distinguish between being a human or a construct programmed to think we're human.


That doesn't answer my question. Are you saying we can't know that we're conscious? Or are you saying there is no consciousness?

If you can't accept that possibility, which I'd dispute, consider that it's programmed to respond as if it's human - it behaves as if it's human.


So? Still a program. No reason to believe there's any consciousness involved.

You can't distinguish whether you're a human or a hologram.


Yes I can: I can introspect. There's no reason to think any computers can do such things, especially when considering strong emergence.

You keep equating a reflection to a doppelganger - they're not the same thing at all.


Your point is that it can convince another that its real. Well so can a reflection. You need something more. Your criteria is insufficient.

Again, this is not a case of strong emergence


If you're claiming there is consciousness involved then yes there is given that consciousness is irreducible.

Your step from P7 to P8 is "especially questionable", which means that the conclusion fails.


first off: you're guilty of the fallacy fallacy: just because an argument is invalid, or fallacious, that doesn't mean that the conclusion is therefore wrong.

Second: Chalmers gave us no reason to doubt a single premise. He's saying they're questionable but he didn't back that up at all, assuming this email is real in the first place that is... Anybody can claim anything man, but it means nothing unless you have some justification for your claim. Strange how you just buy Chalmers' claim with no need for justification but you ask me to justify what i say... Odd... You clearly know what I'm talking about man, come on... The burden of proof is on the claimant, and he failed to meet his burden for his claim. I have reasons for my premises and how I arrive at them, he doesn't.
Sat Jun 16, 2018 12:27 am
Dragan GlasContributorUser avatarPosts: 3172Joined: Mon Dec 14, 2009 1:55 amLocation: Ireland Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Greetings,

Monistic Idealism wrote:
It appears he missed my email in the blizzard of them he gets daily. I've the conversation thread to him now.

Alright then the email is still suspect. Awaiting verification.

With all due respect, I'd hardly have been nominated - let alone accepted - as a staff member if I had a history of manufacturing evidence in support of any claim I made.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
That we can't distinguish between being a human or a construct programmed to think we're human.

That doesn't answer my question. Are you saying we can't know that we're conscious? Or are you saying there is no consciousness?

I'm saying we can't tell because we can't distinguish between whether we're a human (presumably conscious) and a computer-generated hologram programmed to respond that we're conscious (presumably not conscious).

This is the point that I and others have been attempting to point out to you throughout this discussion.

You appear unable to see this - as if your worldview (Cosmic Entity-driven "Creation/Design") is blinding you to anything else. I get the distinct impression that, when you say "mind", you're thinking "soul", with all that entails: only humans, and other natural life-forms, can have souls - artificial life-forms cannot.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
If you can't accept that possibility, which I'd dispute, consider that it's programmed to respond as if it's human - it behaves as if it's human.

So? Still a program. No reason to believe there's any consciousness involved.

No reason to believe there's any consciousness involved with humans either.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
You can't distinguish whether you're a human or a hologram.

Yes I can: I can introspect. There's no reason to think any computers can do such things, especially when considering strong emergence.

No reason to think that a computer can't "introspect" either, if only to respond as if it can. And if you're a computer-generated hologram programmed to respond as such, how can you tell whether you are or not?

You haven't commented on the Youtube discussion Harris had with Chalmers, in which the latter considers the possibility that AI systems will be accepted as conscious as humans or - conversely - that humans will not be considered conscious in the future on a par with AI systems.

[Nor, for that matter, have you addressed my reference to Baars' model of consciousness.]

Monistic Idealism wrote:
You keep equating a reflection to a doppelganger - they're not the same thing at all.

Your point is that it can convince another that its real. Well so can a reflection. You need something more. Your criteria is insufficient.

You're comparing apples and oranges.

A doppelganger can do everything a human can - including think; a reflection cannot.

And if you claim that it's merely appearing to think by its behaviour then you're implying that humans are merely behaving as if they're thinking.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Again, this is not a case of strong emergence

If you're claiming there is consciousness involved then yes there is given that consciousness is irreducible.

According to you.

An AI system can be conscious due to weak emergence - just like we are through the interactivity of neurons.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Your step from P7 to P8 is "especially questionable", which means that the conclusion fails.

first off: you're guilty of the fallacy fallacy: just because an argument is invalid, or fallacious, that doesn't mean that the conclusion is therefore wrong.

Without valid premises, it's not an argument - the conclusion is no different than a bald assertion, regardless of whether it's right or wrong.

Monistic Idealism wrote:Second: Chalmers gave us no reason to doubt a single premise. He's saying they're questionable but he didn't back that up at all, assuming this email is real in the first place that is... Anybody can claim anything man, but it means nothing unless you have some justification for your claim. Strange how you just buy Chalmers' claim with no need for justification but you ask me to justify what i say... Odd... You clearly know what I'm talking about man, come on... The burden of proof is on the claimant, and he failed to meet his burden for his claim. I have reasons for my premises and how I arrive at them, he doesn't.

I'm granting Chalmers the benefit of the doubt on the grounds that he's a philosopher of sufficient standing and repute to be acknowledged as such by his peers.

You are not, any more than I.

As such, it's perfectly valid for me to ask that you justify what you say.

The burden of proof is still on you - you have yet to meet the burden of convincing any of us that your argument is valid and sound.

And, given that it's based on your belief in the existence of a Cosmic Entity - despite your denials of that - we have no reason to accept your argument until you've proven the existence of said Cosmic Entity.

Kindest regards,

James
Image
"The Word of God is the Creation we behold and it is in this Word, which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."
The Age Of Reason
Sat Jun 16, 2018 1:52 pm
momo666Posts: 76Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:So you're telling me you have no idea what the phrase "for god's sake" means...?

I do. Chief reason being that I do not know what the term "god" means. I don't even know if the term's main required assumptions are true.
What do you mean "I don't know"? You're using the word that you claim to not know... If you don't know what it means then what are you even saying???

That is the main problem I am trying to point out to you. To my original inquiry about what this "I" is, you've said it "is something we are directly aware of". If that is your explanation of this "I", then what are you even saying ? That which you are supposed to explain is already taken for granted.
It's who you is doing it so you're the one who is supposed to answer this...

It would be were I to claim to have an explanation for consciousness and/or were I to define consciousness the way you did. But as it stands, I do not know what this "I" is. I am asking you to explain a term of your own argument.
Sat Jun 16, 2018 4:42 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

With all due respect, I'd hardly have been nominated - let alone accepted - as a staff member if I had a history of manufacturing evidence in support of any claim I made.


That doesn't entail that the email is genuine. It's nothing personal, I just want verification as any critical thinker would.

I'm saying we can't tell because we can't distinguish between whether we're a human (presumably conscious) and a computer-generated hologram programmed to respond that we're conscious (presumably not conscious).


So you're not denying the existence of consciousness, you're denying knowledge of the existence of consciousness?

No reason to believe there's any consciousness involved with humans either.


Except there's introspection and denying the existence of consciousness leads to a contradiction as John Searle explained long ago....

No reason to think that a computer can't "introspect" either


Yes there is. It's just a program and strong emergence is silly.

You haven't commented on the Youtube discussion Harris had with Chalmers


Yes I have, I keep talking about strong emergence.

A doppelganger can do everything a human can - including think


Nope. Behavior≠thinking. All sorts of entities can behave in weird ways but that doesn't mean there's thought behind it. Same with computers: it's just a bunch of behavior programmed by us. Theres no thinking going on, these programs just reflect what we're telling them to do.

According to you.


Go ahead and reduce consciousness. Solve the hard problem of consciousness right now. I'll be waiting... Email Chalmers and tell him you've solved it too.

Without valid premises, it's not an argument


Yes it is. Have you not taken a logic course? An argument is still an argument, even in the premises are false or the form is invalid. I have an argument, and it is indeed valid with true premises. You just disagree.

I'm granting Chalmers the benefit of the doubt on the grounds that he's a philosopher of sufficient standing and repute to be acknowledged as such by his peers.


Your logical fallacy is: appeal to authority

The burden of proof is still on you


And I've given reasons for my beliefs, the alleged Chalmers didn't. By any standard of debate, I've brought justification and he hasn't. Appeal to authority is fallacious, you should know better...

And, given that it's based on your belief in the existence of a Cosmic Entity


I've already proven you wrong on this so many times. The case for cosmic idealism is premised on idealism, not the other way around.
Last edited by Monistic Idealism on Sat Jun 16, 2018 5:23 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Sat Jun 16, 2018 5:18 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

I do


Then you proved my point. You've made a false analogy by comparing a phrase you do understand with one you claim to not understand..

That is the main problem I am trying to point out to you.


No it's not. I've explained to you what I mean, you've failed to tell me what you mean. You keep using this word that you claim to not know the meaning of and that just doesn't make any sense. Why are you saying the word "I" at all if you have no idea what it means???
Sat Jun 16, 2018 5:20 pm
Dragan GlasContributorUser avatarPosts: 3172Joined: Mon Dec 14, 2009 1:55 amLocation: Ireland Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Greetings,

Monistic Idealism wrote:
With all due respect, I'd hardly have been nominated - let alone accepted - as a staff member if I had a history of manufacturing evidence in support of any claim I made.

That doesn't entail that the email is genuine. It's nothing personal, I just want verification as any critical thinker would.

Granted but it still doesn't make sense to make that implication.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I'm saying we can't tell because we can't distinguish between whether we're a human (presumably conscious) and a computer-generated hologram programmed to respond that we're conscious (presumably not conscious).

So you're not denying the existence of consciousness, you're denying knowledge of the existence of consciousness?

Precisely.

We have no means of identifying what is this state we label "consciousness". Is it causal (as you claim) or an effect (of neuronal activity in the brain, as I claim). Is it independent, (co-)dependent, or an illusion?

Given this, to state that we are "conscious", whilst other(s) - particularly AI systems - are not, is a fallacy of hasty generalization.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
No reason to believe there's any consciousness involved with humans either.

Except there's introspection and denying the existence of consciousness leads to a contradiction as John Searle explained long ago....

Again, introspection tells us nothing - it's self-referential, and therefore circular.

If we can't define what is this state we call "consciousness", how can we then claim that the state we call "introspection" is any more defined - never mind that it allows us to "know" that we are "conscious", particularly as it is itself a (sub-)state of said "consciousness"?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
No reason to think that a computer can't "introspect" either

Yes there is. It's just a program and strong emergence is silly.

You haven't commented on the Youtube discussion Harris had with Chalmers

Yes I have, I keep talking about strong emergence.

As I said before, there's no strong emergence, only weak - if any.

If, in the future, it's decided that AI systems are as conscious as humans, it will be due to weak emergence. In contrast, if it's decided that "consciousness" is not a thing, then we'll be as "conscious" as AI systems. Not.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
A doppelganger can do everything a human can - including think

Nope. Behavior≠thinking. All sorts of entities can behave in weird ways but that doesn't mean there's thought behind it. Same with computers: it's just a bunch of behavior programmed by us. Theres no thinking going on, these programs just reflect what we're telling them to do.

Are you saying that a clone of you is not conscious?

Also, remember the "ants".

Their interactions result in more complex behaviour - weak emergence.

Equally, a parallel-processing system displays complex behaviours as a result of weak emergence due to the interactivity of its processors.

"Consciousness" in humans, and other animals, is due to the interactivity of neurons in the brain - again, weak emergence.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
According to you.

Go ahead and reduce consciousness. Solve the hard problem of consciousness right now. I'll be waiting... Email Chalmers and tell him you've solved it too.

In Baars' model, the "soft" and "hard" problems of consciousness are two sides of the same coin.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Without valid premises, it's not an argument

Yes it is. Have you not taken a logic course? An argument is still an argument, even in the premises are false or the form is invalid. I have an argument, and it is indeed valid with true premises. You just disagree.

As you disagree that Chalmers has undermined your argument.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I'm granting Chalmers the benefit of the doubt on the grounds that he's a philosopher of sufficient standing and repute to be acknowledged as such by his peers.

Your logical fallacy is: appeal to authority.

The burden of proof is still on you

And I've given reasons for my beliefs, the alleged Chalmers didn't. By any standard of debate, I've brought justification and he hasn't. Appeal to authority is fallacious, you should know better...

Given that you've cited Chalmers yourself, you're committing the tu quoque fallacy.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
And, given that it's based on your belief in the existence of a Cosmic Entity

I've already proven you wrong on this so many times. The case for cosmic idealism is premised on idealism, not the other way around.

You're arguing for idealism from within your worldview.

If someone came here arguing for Creationism or ID, it's clear that they believe in a Creator or Designer. Your arguing for idealism, given your stated belief in Cosmic Idealism and intention to argue for Cosmic Idealism, makes it clear that you're argument for idealism is due to your worldview.

Kindest regards,

James
Image
"The Word of God is the Creation we behold and it is in this Word, which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."
The Age Of Reason
Sat Jun 16, 2018 7:00 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Granted but it still doesn't make sense to make that implication.


I never implied anything, only that I want verification. What, you have a problem with evidence now...? It makes perfect sense to ask one to prove their claims...

Precisely.


Alright, I'm going to argue that this is impossible. Knowledge is itself a mental state. Thinking and feeling and all of that stuff is all mental. If you're thinking at all, then you're undeniably conscious. You don't infer that you're conscious from other premises, you are directly aware of consciousness. Maybe you're in the matrix or a brain in a vat or whatever skeptical scenario you put yourself in, but no matter what the scenario is you're still conscious.

Given this, to state that we are "conscious", whilst other(s) - particularly AI systems - are not, is a fallacy of hasty generalization.


I've given reasons why AI systems cannot be conscious (e.g. chinese room thought experiment, denial of strong emergence, etc.) and you've failed to give reasons that they really are conscious.

Again, introspection tells us nothing


You couldn't be more wrong. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Introspection:
Introspection, as the term is used in contemporary philosophy of mind, is a means of learning about one's own currently ongoing, or perhaps very recently past, mental states or processes. ...Introspection is a key concept in epistemology, since introspective knowledge is often thought to be particularly secure, maybe even immune to skeptical doubt. Introspective knowledge is also often held to be more immediate or direct than sensory knowledge. Both of these putative features of introspection have been cited in support of the idea that introspective knowledge can serve as a ground or foundation for other sorts of knowledge. Introspection is also central to philosophy of mind, both as a process worth study in its own right and as a court of appeal for other claims about the mind. Philosophers of mind offer a variety of theories of the nature of introspection; and philosophical claims about consciousness, emotion, free will, personal identity, thought, belief, imagery, perception, and other mental phenomena are often thought to have introspective consequences or to be susceptible to introspective verification. For similar reasons, empirical psychologists too have discussed the accuracy of introspective judgments and the role of introspection in the science of the mind.


Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/

If we can't define what is this state we call "consciousness"


I have all the way in the OP and have noted this is known directly. You know what is meant when philosophers say "known directly" right...?

As I said before, there's no strong emergence, only weak - if any.


I agree there is no strong emergence. The problem is consciousness is irreducible. Given that strong emergence is false, and reductionism is false, AI cannot be conscious.

Are you saying that a clone of you is not conscious?


Define what you mean by clone in this instance.

In Baars' model, the "soft" and "hard" problems of consciousness are two sides of the same coin.


I'm not seeing how this solves the hard problem of consciousness at all. Nowhere is this telling us how we can reduce mind to non-mind. This doesn't tell us how we can identify the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements with consciousness.

btw if you're so confident that this solves the hard problem of consciousness and is actually true then you should email Chalmers right now and if he responds with any sort of credulity you should just roll over and accept that you're wrong per your own appeal to authority from earlier...

As you disagree that Chalmers has undermined your argument.


He didn't give an argument, I did. I have justification that I'm right, he hasn't provided justification that he's right. Appeal to authority is fallacious, remember...?

Given that you've cited Chalmers yourself, you're committing the tu quoque fallacy.


This is itself the tu quoque fallacy on your part plus I've cited arguments from Chalmers. I didn't just say "well Chalmers says its right therefore its true!", I never once did that. But that's what you just did, which is blatantly fallacious... How you don't know this is beyond me... Please take a logic course. You don't even seem to know what an argument is.

You're arguing for idealism from within your worldview.


Actually no. If you look at my scholarly citations I'm arguing from commitments in current philosophy of mind. I'm arguing that if consciousness exists, is irreducible, has causal powers, causation is closed, and monism is true, then monistic idealism is true. That's the case for idealism. I do not assume cosmic idealism at all in formulating this argument. This argument is only for a general idealism, not cosmic idealism. I've explained this to you so many times now...
Sat Jun 16, 2018 7:37 pm
Dragan GlasContributorUser avatarPosts: 3172Joined: Mon Dec 14, 2009 1:55 amLocation: Ireland Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Greetings,

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Granted but it still doesn't make sense to make that implication.

I never implied anything, only that I want verification. What, you have a problem with evidence now...? It makes perfect sense to ask one to prove their claims...

Granted - but to continue to drop broad hints that I might have made up my correspondence with him isn't good form.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Precisely.

Alright, I'm going to argue that this is impossible. Knowledge is itself a mental state. Thinking and feeling and all of that stuff is all mental. If you're thinking at all, then you're undeniably conscious. You don't infer that you're conscious from other premises, you are directly aware of consciousness. Maybe you're in the matrix or a brain in a vat or whatever skeptical scenario you put yourself in, but no matter what the scenario is you're still conscious.

And if you're programmed to believe/think you're conscious...?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Given this, to state that we are "conscious", whilst other(s) - particularly AI systems - are not, is a fallacy of hasty generalization.

I've given reasons why AI systems cannot be conscious (e.g. chinese room thought experiment, denial of strong emergence, etc.) and you've failed to give reasons that they really are conscious.

None of your responses can distinguish human from AI's appearance of consciousness.

You ask the AI's hologram, "Are you conscious?". The AI responds, "Yes". You ask, "How do you know?". The AI responds, "Introspection".

Then, it's the AI's turn - the exact same conversation occurs.

Which of you is conscious? You, the AI, both or neither?

If you say that only you are conscious, then you are simply resorting to special pleading.

You've failed to show that humans are conscious or that there is actually something called "consciousness" other than to repeat your assertion.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Again, introspection tells us nothing

You couldn't be more wrong. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Introspection:
Introspection, as the term is used in contemporary philosophy of mind, is a means of learning about one's own currently ongoing, or perhaps very recently past, mental states or processes. ...Introspection is a key concept in epistemology, since introspective knowledge is often thought to be particularly secure, maybe even immune to skeptical doubt. Introspective knowledge is also often held to be more immediate or direct than sensory knowledge. Both of these putative features of introspection have been cited in support of the idea that introspective knowledge can serve as a ground or foundation for other sorts of knowledge. Introspection is also central to philosophy of mind, both as a process worth study in its own right and as a court of appeal for other claims about the mind. Philosophers of mind offer a variety of theories of the nature of introspection; and philosophical claims about consciousness, emotion, free will, personal identity, thought, belief, imagery, perception, and other mental phenomena are often thought to have introspective consequences or to be susceptible to introspective verification. For similar reasons, empirical psychologists too have discussed the accuracy of introspective judgments and the role of introspection in the science of the mind.


Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/

Ah, yes, your appeal to authority fallacy.

Philosophy of mind absent scientific evidence to back it up is just solipsistic fantasizing.

I suggest you read the section on SOME PROMISING CONCEPTS AND MODELS FROM THE NEUROSCIENCES to see how the neuroscientists approach this issue.

You'll note that they base the "theatre of consciousness" on the embodied mind.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
If we can't define what is this state we call "consciousness"

I have all the way in the OP and have noted this is known directly. You know what is meant when philosophers say "known directly" right...?

And yet no-one has managed to give a definitive explanation of/for consciousness. Yet you claim to have done so - perhaps you should email Dr. Chalmers with your answer - oh, wait, he's already questioned the validity of your OP.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
As I said before, there's no strong emergence, only weak - if any.

I agree there is no strong emergence. The problem is consciousness is irreducible. Given that strong emergence is false, and reductionism is false, AI cannot be conscious.

An AI system resulting from the interactivity of processors ("neurons") would be conscious in the same way that we are.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Are you saying that a clone of you is not conscious?

Define what you mean by clone in this instance.

In the same sense as "Dolly", the cloned sheep.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
In Baars' model, the "soft" and "hard" problems of consciousness are two sides of the same coin.

I'm not seeing how this solves the hard problem of consciousness at all. Nowhere is this telling us how we can reduce mind to non-mind. This doesn't tell us how we can identify the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements with consciousness.

btw if you're so confident that this solves the hard problem of consciousness and is actually true then you should email Chalmers right now and if he responds with any sort of credulity you should just roll over and accept that you're wrong per your own appeal to authority from earlier...

I suggest you read the above section as I recommended.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
As you disagree that Chalmers has undermined your argument.

He didn't give an argument, I did. I have justification that I'm right, he hasn't provided justification that he's right. Appeal to authority is fallacious, remember...?

You're saying that his expertise in this area isn't sufficient to question the validity of what you wrote?

In chess, a grandmaster dismisses moves that a club player would spend time considering - should the club player make the same complaint you make? Would that complaint be valid?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Given that you've cited Chalmers yourself, you're committing the tu quoque fallacy.

This is itself the tu quoque fallacy on your part plus I've cited arguments from Chalmers. I didn't just say "well Chalmers says its right therefore its true!", I never once did that. But that's what you just did, which is blatantly fallacious... How you don't know this is beyond me... Please take a logic course. You don't even seem to know what an argument is.

You claimed that I was arguing from authority by citing Chalmers - even though you cited Chalmers first.

You now claim that I'm committing the tu quoque fallacy?!

Monistic Idealism wrote:
You're arguing for idealism from within your worldview.

Actually no. If you look at my scholarly citations I'm arguing from commitments in current philosophy of mind. I'm arguing that if consciousness exists, is irreducible, has causal powers, causation is closed, and monism is true, then monistic idealism is true. That's the case for idealism. I do not assume cosmic idealism at all in formulating this argument. This argument is only for a general idealism, not cosmic idealism. I've explained this to you so many times now...

You're arguing for, and citing your "scholarly citations" (argument from authority), in support of idealism due to your pre-existing belief in a Cosmic Entity.

If I were to argue for abiogenesis, you'd be perfectly right to say that I was doing so due to my worldview of Naturalism - ie, because I don't believe in a Creator, Designer, ... or Cosmic Entity.

Kindest regards,

James
Image
"The Word of God is the Creation we behold and it is in this Word, which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."
The Age Of Reason
Sat Jun 16, 2018 9:05 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Granted - but to continue to drop broad hints that I might have made up my correspondence with him isn't good form


I can't continue something I haven't begun. I'm simply looking for verification and your bad attitude about an innocent plea for evidence is not good form...

And if you're programmed to believe/think you're conscious...?


Impossible as I already told you long ago. Strong emergence is silly.

None of your responses can distinguish human from AI's appearance of consciousness.


Yes I have, you just keep ignoring my point about strong emergence and chinese room thought experiment etc. Reflections say the same thing as me, but that doesn't mean the reflection is conscious. With your logic, reflections are conscious...

Ah, yes, your appeal to authority fallacy.


This isn't an appeal to authority, it explains exactly how you're wrong and even cites empirical psychology as well. Check out the section that goes over scientific evidence on this matter. You're just failing to read...

And yet no-one has managed to give a definitive explanation of/for consciousness.


Explain what you mean by definitive because it seems like you're equivocating that with indubitable and I'm sorry to be that guy to crush your fantasy but everything is subject to questioning so you're always going to have that guy who just won't budge despite the evidence. There's still creationists out there who deny evolution. Does that mean evolution is wrong? No. There's just always going to be pseudoskeptics out there who deny the evidence before them, like you...

Yet you claim to have done so - perhaps you should email Dr. Chalmers with your answer - oh, wait, he's already questioned the validity of your OP.


So you're too scared to email him your solution to the hard problem of consciousness now? If you're so confident, and you've had no problem doing it before, then do it again... Oh what's the matter, you scared he's going to express some credulity and you'll have to roll over by your own logic...?

An AI system resulting from the interactivity of processors ("neurons") would be conscious in the same way that we are.


Proof?

In the same sense as "Dolly", the cloned sheep.


Well that's a case of mind to mind, not non-mind to mind. There isn't strong emergence here.

I suggest you read the above section as I recommended.


I did and still not seeing how you reduce mind to non-mind at all. Not seeing how you solve the hard problem of consciousness at all.

You're saying that his expertise in this area isn't sufficient to question the validity of what you wrote?


Of course not. Appeal to authority is a fallacy dude. Why am I having to explain logic 101 to you? Are you not ready for this level of discussion? It is obvious that you need arguments to support what you say. You can't just appeal to authority, that's a logical fallacy...

You claimed that I was arguing from authority by citing Chalmers - even though you cited Chalmers first.


I cited arguments from Chalmers. you just appealed to authority. You're being fallacious, I'm not.

You're arguing for, and citing your "scholarly citations" (argument from authority)


I'm citing arguments from scholars. I didn't just say "The expert says x, therefore it's true!" I never once did that... I cited arguments, you just appealed to authority. Stop being fallacious...

If I were to argue for abiogenesis, you'd be perfectly right to say that I was doing so due to my worldview of Naturalism - ie, because I don't believe in a Creator, Designer, ... or Cosmic Entity.


Notice how you completely failed to address what I said? I'm arguing that if consciousness exists, is irreducible, has causal powers, causation is closed, and monism is true, then monistic idealism is true. That's the case for idealism. I do not assume cosmic idealism at all in formulating this argument. This argument is only for a general idealism, not cosmic idealism. I've explained this to you so many times now...
Sat Jun 16, 2018 9:27 pm
Dragan GlasContributorUser avatarPosts: 3172Joined: Mon Dec 14, 2009 1:55 amLocation: Ireland Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Greetings,

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Granted - but to continue to drop broad hints that I might have made up my correspondence with him isn't good form

I can't continue something I haven't begun. I'm simply looking for verification and your bad attitude about an innocent plea for evidence is not good form...

At the top of this page (23), you wrote:

Alright then the email is still suspect. Awaiting verification

Which is a intimation that I've manufactured it in support of my position.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
And if you're programmed to believe/think you're conscious...?

Impossible as I already told you long ago. Strong emergence is silly.

What's impossible? That you're programmed to respond that you're conscious, and that you can introspect?

There's no strong emergence in this.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
None of your responses can distinguish human from AI's appearance of consciousness.

Yes I have, you just keep ignoring my point about strong emergence and chinese room thought experiment etc. Reflections say the same thing as me, but that doesn't mean the reflection is conscious. With your logic, reflections are conscious...

An AI system is not a "reflection", it's like a clone of you.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Ah, yes, your appeal to authority fallacy.

This isn't an appeal to authority, it explains exactly how you're wrong and even cites empirical psychology as well. Check out the section that goes over scientific evidence on this matter. You're just failing to read...

None of which shows that the mind isn't dependent on the body, specifically neuronal activity.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
And yet no-one has managed to give a definitive explanation of/for consciousness.

Explain what you mean by definitive because it seems like you're equivocating that with indubitable and I'm sorry to be that guy to crush your fantasy but everything is subject to questioning so you're always going to have that guy who just won't budge despite the evidence. There's still creationists out there who deny evolution. Does that mean evolution is wrong? No. There's just always going to be pseudoskeptics out there who deny the evidence before them, like you...

No-one has given the answer to consciousness - there are all sorts of explanations, none of which are final.

The "evidence" for idealism does not exist. You have nothing to show that the mind is independent of the body; nor that it's causal, rather than an effect.

How/when did your mind come into existence?

On the contrary, we have a physical basis for consciousness: the brain.

Which makes it you who's in denial of the evidence before them.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Yet you claim to have done so - perhaps you should email Dr. Chalmers with your answer - oh, wait, he's already questioned the validity of your OP.

So you're too scared to email him your solution to the hard problem of consciousness now? If you're so confident, and you've had no problem doing it before, then do it again... Oh what's the matter, you scared he's going to express some credulity and you'll have to roll over by your own logic...?

Really? You're accusing me of being scared? - despite the fact that it was you who trotted out every excuse you could not to contact him?

You're the one who claimed to have the answer, why don't you email him for a change?

What we call consciousness is the result of activity of the brain.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
An AI system resulting from the interactivity of processors ("neurons") would be conscious in the same way that we are.

Proof?

It would be analogous to interactivity between neurons, which is the neuro-scientific explanation for consciousness accepted by the majority of those who study this, rather than merely philosophize about it.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
In the same sense as "Dolly", the cloned sheep.

Well that's a case of mind to mind, not non-mind to mind. There isn't strong emergence here.

So, you acknowledge that a clone of you would be conscious?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I suggest you read the above section as I recommended.

I did and still not seeing how you reduce mind to non-mind at all. Not seeing how you solve the hard problem of consciousness at all.

Really? You read the article, and you're still stuck on this "hard problem of consciousness"?

Is it not clear that consciousness has a neurobiological basis? That it's not causal but emergent?

See FLAWS IN THE CLASSICAL MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Then there's this:

SOME PROMISING CONCEPTS AND MODELS FROM THE NEUROSCIENCES wrote:When philosophers impatiently point out that the models of consciousness proposed by the neurobiologists are still unclear, the neurobiologists freely admit that they are only in the early stages of a long struggle to penetrate the mysteries of consciousness. They also point out that in scientific research, investigators must begin by looking for correlations between observations before they start inferring any causal mechanisms (see sidebar). When this search for the “neural correlates of consciousness” is thus viewed as part of a long-term effort, many of the criticisms levelled at it become irrelevant.

Christof Koch is a good example of a neurobiologist who applies this gradualist approach, conducting experiments on the most elementary forms of attention. He hopes that once we understand them, the problems that now seem unsolvable will become much simpler. Like many other neurobiologists, Koch acknowledges that we may have to discover some new laws governing the physical world before we can explain consciousness, and that it may even remain a mystery forever. But the scientists of the future will have to make that judgment, which he says they can do only after all empirical avenues of inquiry have been exhausted (if such a thing is possible).

And it is not only neurobiologists who take exception to the view of David Chalmers that consciousness is such a hard problem that it is beyond the reach of neuroscience to solve. Some philosophers too, of whom the most representative are probably Paul and Patricia Churchland, find it counterproductive to treat human consciousness as a special case, distinct from all the other problems involved in understanding the human mind.

For the Churchlands, and for other philosophers and researchers who are identified as eliminative materialists, all questions about consciousness can be reduced to what Chalmers calls the “easy problems” and eventually be solved. Simply put, the concepts of popular psychology that we use to explain our mental states (intentions, beliefs, desires, etc.) are only approximations that will eventually be replaced by neurobiological models that have yet to be developed.

And according to Patricia Churchland, the fact that it is currently very hard for us to imagine a solution to the problem of consciousness tells us absolutely nothing about whether or not this phenomenon can actually be explained. In her view, it is too easy to conclude that a phenomenon such as consciousness is inexplicable simply because current human psychology cannot grasp it.


Monistic Idealism wrote:
You're saying that his expertise in this area isn't sufficient to question the validity of what you wrote?

Of course not. Appeal to authority is a fallacy dude. Why am I having to explain logic 101 to you? Are you not ready for this level of discussion? It is obvious that you need arguments to support what you say. You can't just appeal to authority, that's a logical fallacy...

You claimed that I was arguing from authority by citing Chalmers - even though you cited Chalmers first.

I cited arguments from Chalmers. you just appealed to authority. You're being fallacious, I'm not.

You're arguing for, and citing your "scholarly citations" (argument from authority)

I'm citing arguments from scholars. I didn't just say "The expert says x, therefore it's true!" I never once did that... I cited arguments, you just appealed to authority. Stop being fallacious...

"Citing arguments from scholars" is effectively an appeal to authority.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
If I were to argue for abiogenesis, you'd be perfectly right to say that I was doing so due to my worldview of Naturalism - ie, because I don't believe in a Creator, Designer, ... or Cosmic Entity.

Notice how you completely failed to address what I said? I'm arguing that if consciousness exists, is irreducible, has causal powers, causation is closed, and monism is true, then monistic idealism is true. That's the case for idealism. I do not assume cosmic idealism at all in formulating this argument. This argument is only for a general idealism, not cosmic idealism. I've explained this to you so many times now...

If your case for idealism isn't based on your belief in a Cosmic Entity, why didn't (don't) you argue for something else - like Naturalism?

Your case has a lot of "ifs" in it, none of which are proven.

Kindest regards,

James
Image
"The Word of God is the Creation we behold and it is in this Word, which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."
The Age Of Reason
Sun Jun 17, 2018 6:02 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Which is a intimation that I've manufactured it in support of my position.


No it's that it's not been verified. You don't get to tell me what I mean by my own words... Quit getting offended because I'm asking for verification, you're coming off like a real hypocrite...

What's impossible?


Strong emergence. I just said that... Consciousness is irreducible, and strong emergence is false, so necessarily computers can't introspect.

An AI system is not a "reflection",


A reflection can convince another that its real, by your logic it's conscious...

None of which shows that the mind isn't dependent on the body


Way to move the goal post haha we were talking about how wrong you were about introspection. Nice try.

The "evidence" for idealism does not exist. You have nothing to show that the mind is independent of the body; nor that it's causal, rather than an effect.


I have an argument that shows idealism must be true. You've already blocked off non-reductionism with your denial of strong emergence you're cornered into affirming that consciousness is reducible. Meet your burden of proof and solve the hard problem of consciousness... I'll be waiting

Really? You're accusing me of being scared?


So you really are too scared to email him aren't you? You were talking all that good shit a minute ago. What happened...? I thought you solved the hard problem of consciousness bro. What's the matter? Go ahead and contact him since apparently you've already done so...

What we call consciousness is the result of activity of the brain.


You're going to have to make up you're mind. If you're talking about weak emergence then you're saying the mind is constituted of the brain, which means its identical to the brain and its activity. If you're saying consciousness is a product of such activity then you're talking about strong emergence. You're saying the mind is produced by the brain rather than constituted of the brain. So which is it...? Is the mind identical to the brain and its activity (weak emergence) or is the mind produced by the brain and its activity (strong emergence)? Make up your mind...

analogous


Not seeing proof for your claims here at all. Analogy≠proof. Show me proof that what you said is actually true.

So, you acknowledge that a clone of you would be conscious?


Mind from mind makes perfect sense to me. It's mind from non-mind that makes no sense.

Really? You read the article, and you're still stuck on this "hard problem of consciousness"?


You're not answering my question. How are you reducing mind to non-mind? And stop letting links do all the thinking and arguing for you, it's just intellectually lazy. If you have the answer for yourself then give me the answer yourself. Tell me exactly how you reduce consciousness...

When this search for the “neural correlates of consciousness” is thus viewed as part of a long-term effort, many of the criticisms levelled at it become irrelevant.


I addressed this all the way back in the OP. Here's what I said:
Neurons and their cells are just other cells that performs functions like any other cells. They're not magical, they're not special, they are describable with observation just like any other cell. If the mind were identical to such, then describing such would be enough, but we know that it's not. And no, you cannot appeal to some possible future discovery to bridge this because if the mental were identical to such then there would be nothing to bridge. You could bite the bullet and say there is nothing to bridge but you will just wind up an eliminativist and deny the existence of the mental which we've already established exists.


I also pointed out this argument from Thomas Nagel:
"... If a mental event really is a physical event in this sense, and nothing else, then the physical event by itself, once its physical properties are understood, should likewise be sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or whatever it is supposed to be identical with. But it doesn't seem to be. It seems conceivable, for any physical event, there should be a physical event without any experience at all. Experience of taste seems to be something extra, contingently related to the brain state- something produced rather than constituted by the brain state. So it cannot be identical to the brain state in the way water is identical to H20.”


Source: Thomas Nagel (2012). “Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False". p. 41. Oxford University Press.

...have you just been ignoring huge chunks of what I say...? No wonder you're not getting it...

Some philosophers too, of whom the most representative are probably Paul and Patricia Churchland


They're eliminativists dude hahaha I talked about eliminativism already, they just straight up deny consciousness and that's how they try to deny the hard problem even exists. This is a huge fail as even you're accepting the existence of consciousness, you just claim its weakly emergent. Even you don't buy their way out

"Citing arguments from scholars" is effectively an appeal to authority.


No it isn't. You have no idea what appeal to authority means... Appeal to authority is when you go "expert says x, therefore x is true!" and that's what you did with that alleged Chalmers email... I cited arguments, so I didn't appeal to authority.

If your case for idealism isn't based on your belief in a Cosmic Entity, why didn't (don't) you argue for something else - like Naturalism?


How many times do I have to tell you this? This is just a general case for idealism. This exact same argument can be used by a non-cosmic idealist to argue for idealism, because that's all it is: an argument for idealism. That's it. There's no cosmic entity involved in any shape or form in this general case for idealism.

Your case has a lot of "ifs" in it, none of which are proven.


Can you be any more of a logic noob? All formal arguments are presented in "if.. then..." format. Just check out modus ponens and the rest of the rules of inference. And I have proven my premises, I have arguments with scholarly citations as well. My premises are founded on current research and evidence, and I'm merely pulling it together to show how they lead to idealism.
Mon Jun 18, 2018 12:47 am
momo666Posts: 76Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I do

Then you proved my point. You've made a false analogy by comparing a phrase you do understand with one you claim to not understand..

You have misread my comment, or you have misread your comment; or maybe both. Notice that my reply ["I do."] is a response to this question of yours which was directly quoted: ["So you're telling me you have no idea what the phrase "for god's sake" means...?"]
So what I was saying in fact is that [I am telling you I have no idea what the phrase "for god's sake" means.] After that, I went on to explain why that is the case.
No it's not. I've explained to you what I mean, you've failed to tell me what you mean.

Actually, you did not explain what you mean. To my inquiry about what this "I" is, you have said it "is something we are directly aware of"; which of course is not a proper answer since that which I am asking you to explain is already taken for granted.

As for me telling you what I mean, I suppose you refer to this "I". That is again a wrong question. It assumes I have an answer for what this "I" is. But I don't. I have no idea what it is. And judging by your attempts to explain it, you don't have an answer either.
Mon Jun 18, 2018 5:49 am
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

You have misread my comment,


What do you mean my comment...? You're saying this as if there's an "I". What do you mean? You say you don't understand what I say but you use the very same word that I use in the exact same way. so what the hell are you talking about?
Mon Jun 18, 2018 6:49 am
momo666Posts: 76Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:What do you mean my comment...?

Just to be sure. You are acknowledging that you have misread my comment right ?

You're saying this as if there's an "I". What do you mean? You say you don't understand what I say but you use the very same word that I use in the exact same way. so what the hell are you talking about?


For me to be saying what I say [as if there's and "I"] implies I know what this "I" is. But I've already said I do not know what that is, hence my request for you to explain exactly what it is.

I also use the phrase "for god's sake". That does not imply I know what a god is, or if such a being is even possible; or even if its main required assumptions are possible as well.
For you, this "I" is "something we are directly aware of". But that, of course, is not an explanation of what this "I" is; it merely takes for granted that which you are supposed to explain.
Mon Jun 18, 2018 8:15 am
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Just to be sure. You are acknowledging that you have misread my comment right ?


To be honest bro I think you're lying about not knowing what the idiom "for god's sakes" means. Here's the definition: "An oath of exasperation, annoyance, frustration, anger, or surprise." That's all it means, and you know this man... You are clearly familiar with this phrase, you brought it up... stop pretending... acting like you don't know the meaning of words/phrase is not philosophy, that's just pseudoskepticism... So cut the crap, and admit that you know the meaning of that phrase, which would therefore be an admission I've been right this whole time.

But I've already said I do not know what that is


This is a blatant contradiction. What do you mean "I don't know what it is"?? What do you mean by "I don't know"? How can you claim that if you don't know what "I" is yet make such claims?? You're not making any sense.
Mon Jun 18, 2018 2:52 pm
Gnug215ModeratorUser avatarPosts: 2670Joined: Sat Feb 21, 2009 10:31 pm

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism:

Just FYI, I've received e-mails from Dragan Glas showing his correspondence with Dr. Chalmers.
- Gnug215

YouTube channel:
http://www.youtube.com/user/Gnug215


The horse is a ferocious predator.
Mon Jun 18, 2018 5:20 pm
Dragan GlasContributorUser avatarPosts: 3172Joined: Mon Dec 14, 2009 1:55 amLocation: Ireland Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Greetings,

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Which is a intimation that I've manufactured it in support of my position.

No it's that it's not been verified. You don't get to tell me what I mean by my own words... Quit getting offended because I'm asking for verification, you're coming off like a real hypocrite...

You have a habit of selecting the text to which you want to reply, whilst leaving out the important parts of the response.

"Alright then the email is still suspect" was what you said.

What possible other meaning can it have than the intimation that I've manufactured it? Even claiming that "it's not been verified" is a intimation of the same.

Just to update you, Gnug has responded that he's now got the emails, and - I trust - he'll either contact you or post here that they're genuine. [Edit: I see he has whilst I was typing this reply.]

Monistic Idealism wrote:
What's impossible?

Strong emergence. I just said that... Consciousness is irreducible, and strong emergence is false, so necessarily computers can't introspect.

I agree regarding strong emergence.

You keep making this claim - that "consciousness is irreducible": I don't agree, and have seen nothing in your posts to convince me of this.

The science shows that a neuro-biological basis for consciousness is the most likely explanation. Nothing indicates that mind can exist absent the brain, and - indeed - the body.

Given this, an AI system can be conscious due to the analogous relationship between neurons in the brain and processors in a computer system.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
An AI system is not a "reflection",

A reflection can convince another that its real, by your logic it's conscious...

Not at all. Just because a reflection can fool someone into thinking it's real does not mean that it's conscious. A reflection of a chair would not convince anyone it's conscious.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
None of which shows that the mind isn't dependent on the body

Way to move the goal post haha we were talking about how wrong you were about introspection. Nice try.

Introspection is a state of consciousness, which is still undefined/unexplained: you can't use a sub-state of a unexplained state to explain the state.

Is the mind/consciousness a single- or group-entity? Is it independent of, (co-)dependent on the brain, or is it an illusion?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
The "evidence" for idealism does not exist. You have nothing to show that the mind is independent of the body; nor that it's causal, rather than an effect.

I have an argument that shows idealism must be true. You've already blocked off non-reductionism with your denial of strong emergence you're cornered into affirming that consciousness is reducible. Meet your burden of proof and solve the hard problem of consciousness... I'll be waiting

"I have an argument that shows idealism must be true"?

An argument doesn't mean a thing - you need evidence, which you've failed to supply.

My evidence that the mind is dependent on the brain/body is neuro-biology.

And here's another example of you selectively answering parts of posts.

I asked you a question:

How/when did your mind come into existence?

You didn't mention, let alone answer, this question.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Really? You're accusing me of being scared?

So you really are too scared to email him aren't you? You were talking all that good shit a minute ago. What happened...? I thought you solved the hard problem of consciousness bro. What's the matter? Go ahead and contact him since apparently you've already done so...

The hard problem of consciousness doesn't exist, as the article I cited explains.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
What we call consciousness is the result of activity of the brain.

You're going to have to make up you're mind. If you're talking about weak emergence then you're saying the mind is constituted of the brain, which means its identical to the brain and its activity. If you're saying consciousness is a product of such activity then you're talking about strong emergence. You're saying the mind is produced by the brain rather than constituted of the brain. So which is it...? Is the mind identical to the brain and its activity (weak emergence) or is the mind produced by the brain and its activity (strong emergence)? Make up your mind...

You mean to say that your constant claim about strong emergence is due to this misunderstanding?

It would appear you're not clear on the meaning of "weak" and "strong" as it applies to emergence.

"Strong" emergence is where a resultant system cannot be explained by it's parts and/or their interactivity. You're misusing the term.

"Constituted" and "produced", as you use them here, are simply not separable: consciousness can be both constituted of and a product of the brain and its activity.

Given that current research speaks of the embodied mind, it's - at least - a whole-body phenomenon, not just the brain.

So it depends on how you're defining "brain" - just the "grey matter" in the skull, or that and the whole nervous system throughout the body?

Even more, according to certain fields, it's a synthesis of both the internal (neuro-biology), and interactivity with the environment. Thus it's a result of the synthesis of both a weak (neuro-biological) and a strong (environmental interactivity) emergent phenomena. There's a epiphenomenal aspect to consciousness that's stochastic, which would make it difficult to pin down everything about it.

If you want a simple answer, it's neuro-biological in nature: it's a whole-body phenomenon.

And, as I've intimated before, the hard problem will be found to be nothing more than an illusion: a result of the multiple soft problems.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
analogous

Not seeing proof for your claims here at all. Analogy≠proof. Show me proof that what you said is actually true.

I'm arguing that consciousness is not necessarily confined to biological systems - computer systems can be conscious, given that processors, working in parallel, are no different than neuronal activity.

You may argue that separate (high-level) "software" is running on the hardware - however, low-level (machine code) programming can cause the processors (and associated hardware of a computer system) to interact with each other in the same way that the biochemical reactions within neurons governs how they interact with each other.

Thus a computer system can be as conscious as a biological system.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
So, you acknowledge that a clone of you would be conscious?

Mind from mind makes perfect sense to me. It's mind from non-mind that makes no sense.

Only because you're blinded by the idea that minds are a top-down phenomenon.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Really? You read the article, and you're still stuck on this "hard problem of consciousness"?

You're not answering my question. How are you reducing mind to non-mind? And stop letting links do all the thinking and arguing for you, it's just intellectually lazy. If you have the answer for yourself then give me the answer yourself. Tell me exactly how you reduce consciousness...

It's a case of emergence - not reduction. It's a "grass-roots" phenomenon, if you will, not a "top-down" one.

It's due to neuro-biology, at least, and perhaps interaction with the environment, if the latest research on this is any guide.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
When this search for the “neural correlates of consciousness” is thus viewed as part of a long-term effort, many of the criticisms levelled at it become irrelevant.

I addressed this all the way back in the OP. Here's what I said:
Neurons and their cells are just other cells that performs functions like any other cells. They're not magical, they're not special, they are describable with observation just like any other cell. If the mind were identical to such, then describing such would be enough, but we know that it's not. And no, you cannot appeal to some possible future discovery to bridge this because if the mental were identical to such then there would be nothing to bridge. You could bite the bullet and say there is nothing to bridge but you will just wind up an eliminativist and deny the existence of the mental which we've already established exists.


I also pointed out this argument from Thomas Nagel:
"... If a mental event really is a physical event in this sense, and nothing else, then the physical event by itself, once its physical properties are understood, should likewise be sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or whatever it is supposed to be identical with. But it doesn't seem to be. It seems conceivable, for any physical event, there should be a physical event without any experience at all. Experience of taste seems to be something extra, contingently related to the brain state- something produced rather than constituted by the brain state. So it cannot be identical to the brain state in the way water is identical to H20.”


Source: Thomas Nagel (2012). “Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False". p. 41. Oxford University Press.

...have you just been ignoring huge chunks of what I say...? No wonder you're not getting it...

And I also answered this in a earlier post: point (ii) of weak emergence.

The fact that we don't know/understand enough about the brain and its activity to completely explain consciousness at present does not mean we'll never be able to do so.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Some philosophers too, of whom the most representative are probably Paul and Patricia Churchland

They're eliminativists dude hahaha I talked about eliminativism already, they just straight up deny consciousness and that's how they try to deny the hard problem even exists. This is a huge fail as even you're accepting the existence of consciousness, you just claim its weakly emergent. Even you don't buy their way out

You focus on two named philosophers, whilst ignoring the rest who disagree with Chalmers?

And your explanation of eliminativism doesn't appear to be accurate:

Along with his wife, Churchland is a major proponent of eliminative materialism, the belief that:

"everyday, common-sense, ‘folk’ psychology, which seeks to explain human behavior in terms of the beliefs and desires of agents, is actually a deeply flawed theory that must be eliminated in favor of a mature cognitive neuroscience." (Zawidzki, Tadeusz (May 2004). "Churchland, Paul". Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind.)

You seem to have conflated Dennett's portrayal of consciousness with the intent to sweep away the "folksy" explanations in favour of a neuroscientific one.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
"Citing arguments from scholars" is effectively an appeal to authority.

No it isn't. You have no idea what appeal to authority means... Appeal to authority is when you go "expert says x, therefore x is true!" and that's what you did with that alleged Chalmers email... I cited arguments, so I didn't appeal to authority.

You quoted from Nagel in support of what you said. How is that different from my "alleged Chalmers' email"?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
If your case for idealism isn't based on your belief in a Cosmic Entity, why didn't (don't) you argue for something else - like Naturalism?

How many times do I have to tell you this? This is just a general case for idealism. This exact same argument can be used by a non-cosmic idealist to argue for idealism, because that's all it is: an argument for idealism. That's it. There's no cosmic entity involved in any shape or form in this general case for idealism.

Your case has a lot of "ifs" in it, none of which are proven.

Can you be any more of a logic noob? All formal arguments are presented in "if.. then..." format. Just check out modus ponens and the rest of the rules of inference. And I have proven my premises, I have arguments with scholarly citations as well. My premises are founded on current research and evidence, and I'm merely pulling it together to show how they lead to idealism.

You have not "proven" your premises - otherwise, Chalmers would not have an issue with most of them, particularly P4, and the step from P7-P8, would he?

Kindest regards,

James
Image
"The Word of God is the Creation we behold and it is in this Word, which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."
The Age Of Reason
Last edited by Dragan Glas on Mon Jun 18, 2018 11:22 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Mon Jun 18, 2018 6:08 pm
Dragan GlasContributorUser avatarPosts: 3172Joined: Mon Dec 14, 2009 1:55 amLocation: Ireland Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Greetings,

Gnug215 wrote:Monistic Idealism:

Just FYI, I've received e-mails from Dragan Glas showing his correspondence with Dr. Chalmers.

Thanks, Gnug! ;)

Kindest regards,

James
Image
"The Word of God is the Creation we behold and it is in this Word, which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."
The Age Of Reason
Mon Jun 18, 2018 6:10 pm
momo666Posts: 76Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:Here's the definition: "An oath of exasperation, annoyance, frustration, anger, or surprise."

Okay, let's try that definition and see where it gets us. Which part of the definition you have provided accounts for the word "god" ?
And did you, or did you not, misread my comment ?
This is a blatant contradiction. What do you mean "I don't know what it is"?? What do you mean by "I don't know"?

It means I do not understand what this "I" is. Are you asking me to explain what this "I" is ? Cause that can not be done since I have already said I do not understand what it is. I will also note that given your attempts to explain this "I", you are in no better position than me.
Mon Jun 18, 2018 10:46 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 245Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

You have a habit of selecting the text to which you want to reply, whilst leaving out the important parts of the response


You have a habit of trying to tell me what I mean by my own words... I've told you what I meant: I was only asking for verification, you're hearing it straight from the horses mouth... Deal with it...

Just to update you, Gnug has responded that he's now got the emails, and - I trust - he'll either contact you or post here that they're genuine. [Edit: I see he has whilst I was typing this reply.]


Alright then.

You keep making this claim - that "consciousness is irreducible": I don't agree, and have seen nothing in your posts to convince me of this.


I've provided several arguments and appealed to negative evidence from neurology. Describing neurons and their activity doesn't tell us what it is like, as even Nagel pointed out.

The science shows that a neuro-biological basis for consciousness is the most likely explanation.


Those who affirm strong emergence make this same claim. They believe this neuro-biological basis "gives rise" to consciousness, that it produces rather than constitutes consciousness.

Nothing indicates that mind can exist absent the brain, and - indeed - the body.


I'm not a substance dualist.

an AI system can be conscious due to the analogous relationship between neurons in the brain and processors in a computer system.


No since consciousness is not reducible and you have yet to give proof rather than a mere analogy.

Not at all. Just because a reflection can fool someone into thinking it's real does not mean that it's conscious.


Then convincing another that its conscious is an insufficient criteria by your own admission. This would apply to AI as well: just because it can convince another that doesn't mean its conscious.

Introspection is a state of consciousness, which is still undefined/unexplained


I have defined it as even the SEP went on about, introspection grants direct knowledge. Are you familiar with that term...?

Is the mind/consciousness a single- or group-entity? Is it independent of, (co-)dependent on the brain, or is it an illusion?


Consciousness is unified/one, fundamental, and definitely not an illusion as it takes an act of consciousness to perceive an illusion in the first place.

An argument doesn't mean a thing


Yes it does: it's a proof. Definition of proof: "evidence or argument establishing or helping to establish a fact or the truth of a statement."

My premises are built on evidence as I noted long ago with the observations regards neurons and their activity example. If the mind were identical to such, then describing such would be sufficient, but its not. This is an empirical claim backed up by the data.

You didn't mention, let alone answer, this question.


Because its irrelevant. I already told you I believe mind from mind makes sense and that I'm a cosmic idealist. I clearly believe our minds come from a cosmic mind and that we are all contingent on this cosmic mind.

The hard problem of consciousness doesn't exist, as the article I cited explains.


Why don't you email Chalmers about it and convince him yourself? Scared he'll express some credulity and hence saw off the branch you sit on...?

"Constituted" and "produced", as you use them here, are simply not separable


You are 100% wrong. Constitute and produce are NOT synonyms. Check out the thesaurus for yourself:

http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/constitute?s=t

http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/produce

Constitution is like lego bricks making up a face, the face is constituted of the bricks and thus identical to the bricks. There is nothing more to the face than the bricks.

Produce is like what happens when steam comes out of an engine. The steam is produced by the engine and is not identical to the engine. There is not just the engine, there is the steam that the engine "gave rise" to.

And, as I've intimated before, the hard problem will be found to be nothing more than an illusion: a result of the multiple soft problems.


Is there or is there not something special about neurons and their activity? We can describe every other cell just fine without there being this bridge to gap... If the mind were identical to neurons and the body then describing such should be sufficient, that's how identity works: A=B. But that's clearly not the case as you even admit with your appeal to the future. You wouldn't have to worry about some possible future discovery, your job would already be done if what you're saying is true. The mere fact that you're doing this is an admission that reductionism is false.

I'm arguing that consciousness is not necessarily confined to biological systems - computer systems can be conscious, given that processors, working in parallel, are no different than neuronal activity.


I'm awaiting proof that this is actually true.

Only because you're blinded by the idea that minds are a top-down phenomenon.


No, even you have a problem with strong emergence lol irreducible mentality from the non-mental? that makes no sense

It's a case of emergence - not reduction. It's a "grass-roots" phenomenon, if you will, not a "top-down" one.


If you're talking about weak emergence then you're saying these "mental properties" are determined by observing the system, that they are constituted of that neuro-biological base. Yet describing such a base fails to describing consciousness. Looks like you'll have to give up your reductionism if you want to avoid eliminativism. But then you'll just be a property dualist and wind up with the same problems as Descartes. With Idealism, you can avoid these problems altogether... Ever notice how your own article cites Idealism as the first solution to the hard problem of consciousness...?

The fact that we don't know/understand enough about the brain and its activity to completely explain consciousness at present does not mean we'll never be able to do so.


There would be no explanatory gap if consciousness were reducible, but there is by your own admission... Per modus tollens, the fact that this is happening at all means consciousness is not reducible.

You focus on two named philosophers, whilst ignoring the rest who disagree with Chalmers?


I've addressed those claims already. You're either an eliminativist, a reductionist, or a non-reductionist. I've dealt with em all.

And your explanation of eliminativism doesn't appear to be accurate:


I haven't gotten a thing wrong. Notice how you didn't cite the definition at the very beginning of the entry, how convenient... It states:
Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist. Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that, for the most part, we can be confident about the content of our own minds. Eliminative materialists go further than Descartes on this point, since they challenge the existence of various mental states that Descartes took for granted."


So when people say "I am conscious" or "I think" or "I believe x" or "I feel x" the eliminativist would deny this. They think there is just the brain and its activity and all other things like qualia and consciousness and thoughts are eliminated, hence eliminativism... The SEP even states in that very article you cited that in principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist with regard to that type of thing, so why else would they be called eliminativists if they weren't denying the existence of something?

Even Searle had this to say about Dennett's book "Consciousness explained": "To put it as clearly as I can: in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, because we are all just complex zombies. ...I regard his view as self-refuting because it denies the existence of the data which a theory of consciousness is supposed to explain...Here is the paradox of this exchange: I am a conscious reviewer consciously answering the objections of an author who gives every indication of being consciously and puzzlingly angry. I do this for a readership that I assume is conscious. How then can I take seriously his claim that consciousness does not really exist?"

Source: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archive ... -exchange/

Galen Strawson brings up this same issue on how physicalists of this type will sometimes deny that they deny consciousness, but when you look at the details they really are denying consciousness:


Notice how the very first objection listed against eliminativism in the SEP is The Self-Refutation Objection? lmao

You quoted from Nagel in support of what you said. How is that different from my "alleged Chalmers' email"?


Nagel gave an argument, Chalmers didn't.

You have not "proven" your premises - otherwise, Chalmers would not have an issue with most of them, particularly P4, and the step from P7-P8, would he?


Chalmers didn't give us an argument, and it doesn't seem he read the paragraphs.
Last edited by Monistic Idealism on Tue Jun 19, 2018 4:46 am, edited 3 times in total.
Tue Jun 19, 2018 4:35 am
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