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The Case for Idealism

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The Case for Idealism
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Steelmage99Posts: 203Joined: Thu May 28, 2015 9:43 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Would you please point out where I defend other users?
Please, be really specific.


Don't play dumb, it's disingenuous. You and I both know your comment was a reference to something I said to Akamia about how he's all of a sudden got something to say all this time. You were branching off what I said to him in defense of him. Funny how emotionally charged your comment was too, interesting how emotionally invested you are in a conversation that's not even yours...


I think it is time you took a step back.
Blunder that theists make all the time;

Pretending to know what other people think.
Sun Jul 15, 2018 8:56 am
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

I think it is time you took a step back.


wow, nice rebuttal

I think it is time you address the case for idealism or just go away.
Sun Jul 15, 2018 6:27 pm
momo666Posts: 135Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:You're claiming there is this "I" that notices. That is just a synonym for self-awareness, self-consciousness.

Definition of notice: attention; observation.
Synonymous with: awareness, consciousness, perception.

"I" being what exactly ? What is aware ? What is conscious ? What pays attention ? What does the observing ? What has perception ? Just how many iterations this question needs to take in order for you to finally admit you don't have the slightest clue what "mind" is ?

you clearly didn't because this is all spelled out in the article.

Then it should be fairly simple for you to quote the part where it explains what does the knowing.
Tue Jul 17, 2018 12:35 am
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

>I don't understand what "I" means in any shape or form
>I notice x
You're going to have to make up your mind, momo... you can't keep contradicting yourself and acting like it didn't happen...

Then it should be fairly simple for you to quote the part where it explains what does the knowing.


You're getting confused. If you weren't lying about reading the article then you should know exactly how I presented a perfectly reasonable defense of knowledge by acquaintance. You're just complaining about a lack of knowledge by description for something that is knowledge by acquaintance. Clearly you didn't read the article...
Tue Jul 17, 2018 12:40 am
momo666Posts: 135Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:>I don't understand what "I" means in any shape or form
>I notice x

What does the noticing ?

If you weren't lying about reading the article then you should know exactly how I presented a perfectly reasonable defense of knowledge by acquaintance. You're just complaining about a lack of knowledge by description for something that is knowledge by acquaintance. Clearly you didn't read the article...


Throw as many baseless attacks as you want. It should be fairly simple for you to quote where exactly does your cited article explain what does the knowing. Until you explain what does the knowing, saying this "I" is something known by "acquaintance" is laughably besides the point.
Wed Jul 18, 2018 5:41 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

What does the noticing ?


According to you it's "I". Stop playing dumb, you know what you said...

It should be fairly simple for you to quote where exactly does your cited article explain what does the knowing.


I already told you: you're confused. You're getting mixed up. Go back and read to get everything in context. The point I'm responding to is your complaint that you need knowledge by description, but I already told you that there's knowledge by acquaintance. Learn to read.
Wed Jul 18, 2018 5:47 pm
Dragan GlasContributorUser avatarPosts: 3210Joined: Mon Dec 14, 2009 1:55 amLocation: Ireland Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Greetings,

I'm going to rearrange your post to bring several of your replies together as they relate to the same issue(s).

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I disagreed with this analogy on the grounds that, if consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, they can't be identical, so it's a false analogy.

Then that would mean you're contradicting your commitment to weak emergence. That analogy I brought up about the hand was in the context of your claims regarding weak emergence. If you're talking about epiphenomenonalism then you are moving away from reductionism and moving onto to non-reductive physicalism/property dualism. This would mean you actually agree with me about anti-reductionism of the mind and thus moving away from your older position.

See my point above about your analogy.

See my point above about your confusion regarding the analogy.

Ergo, by your argument, consciousness is reducible.

You're getting mixed up. The analogy was that if A=B then identifying A identifies B. A in this instance is the hand, and B in the five fingered thing attached to your arm. In this case, identifying A identifies B since they're the same thing. They're identical, they are alike in every detail. The problem is, this doesn't happen with the brain and consciousness. Identifying the brain does NOT identify consciousness, epiphenomenonalists agree with this as they see the mind as irreducible. If you're an epiphenomenonalist then you're moving away from reductionism.

Your analogy was poorly chosen if you wished to show that reductionism is false.

The "hand=brain"/"five-fingered thing at the end of your arm=consciousness" pairings were flawed because, although "hand" and "five-fingered thing at the end of your arm" are clearly identical, that implies that "brain" and "consciousness" are equally identical, when you're attempting to argue that they are not. As it is, your analogy implies that brain and consciousness are identical and that, therefore, reductionism is true.

If you wished to argue that reductionism is false, then a better analogy would have been "hand=brain"/"glove=consciousness".

Clearly, "hand" and "glove" are not identical, which implies that "brain" and "consciousness" are equally not identical. One might go on to explain that just as a glove is "shaped" by the hand, so too is consciousness "shaped" by the brain.

Regardless, your analogy was flawed.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
"Seems more like" is not "is".

...what...?

This is what happens when you don't quote what people say in full – you only end up confusing yourself, as well as others.

You said:

Nope. See the hard problem of consciousness. It seems more like consciousness is fundamental.

You are assuming that, due to your creationist world-view – that is simply not necessarily the case.

As I said earlier, all the empiric evidence indicates that consciousness is not fundamental but a result of a combination of neuro-biology and our interactions with others and the environment in general.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
The "hard problem" has been suggested to be nothing more than a combination of "soft" problems, which are currently being investigated.

And I've refuted this. If A=B, then identifying A identifies B. If they really were identical there would be no gap here, just as there would be no gap between the hand and the fiver fingered thing attached to your arm. The fact that you admit there's this gap in your knowledge is an admission that reductionism is false. The eliminativist would be in a much better position than you to deny the hard problem, but then they're just going to refute themselves since the denial of consciousness is contradictory. So you really can't get out of the hard problem here.

You haven't refuted this - as I've explained earlier, just because there's currently a gap in our knowledege/understanding of consciousness, doesn't mean that there's an actual gap or that we'll never be able to solve the so-called "hard problem". Reductionism is still on the table.

We still haven't described A yet, despite your claims to the contrary - as Seung [2013, 256-7] notes:

To propely wire up the model neurons in the simulation, it would be necessary to find your connectome. Right now we can't envision any way of doing that without destroying your brain in the process.

What does this tell you? We haven't identified the connectome – ergo, we haven't described A yet. And the connectome is just one aspect - although critical - of many that we have yet to identify.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I was exploring various possible solutions within naturalism, which is where I stand on the explanation for consciousness. None of them have been ruled out yet.

K well you still have the burden of proof. You want to claim strong emergence is true? Then the burden of proof is on you to support your claims.

I'm not claiming strong emergence is the answer – merely that the various possible naturalistic explanations are not ruled out yet, the least likely of these being strong emergence.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I'm capable of changing my mind as new research, etc, changes the state of conciousness studies. Are you able to change your mind? We'll see as this discussion progresses.

Sure I am, if there's convincing reasons to do so. I'll give you this, I'm glad you're coming out with it at least in terms of changing your mind. You should have changed your mind from earlier, weak emergence and reductionism is on its face obviously false as Nagel and others have explained.

They're simply philosophizing – none of which is relevant without empiric evidence to back them up. It's still possible that one of these may turn out to be the answer, whether they – or you - like it or not. (I'll come back to what you claim in this paragraph later.)

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Updating one's knowledge is a necessary step in learning. The latest edition was obviously necessary as the field has changed sufficiently to require it.

It's interesting how you're so dependent on these other authors though. Do you really not see for yourself which way various logical commitments will take you? If you think the mind is irreducible and the universe is causally closed then you're an epiphenomenalist. You don't need an author to tell you that, the logic is all there.

That's what you believe - I never stated that I thought the mind was irreducible. Mental exercises are all well and good but they don't count for anything if the empiric evidence shows otherwise. The field has moved on since 2010 when the second edition was published. I'm not sure how it's changed overall, and won't know until I read the latest edition – or, at least, the relevant sections. Dennett's most recent book, From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds, is also out, and I intend reading it as well, which should help bring me up to speed with recent developments in consciousness studies.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Kindly name a monist version that you imply he mentions that doesn't fit into the broad categories I listed.

Kindly read the article that you make so many claims about. It makes no sense for you to say so much about something you haven't even read...

The onus is on you to name a monist version that doesn't fit into the broad categories I mentioned.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
"Suggests" through parsimony – not "said".

I already told you, Chalmers is not affirming this argument he's just outlining it. He's not actually saying this is more likely or anything like that, he was just giving the argument. You have got to learn to read more carefully. This isn't the first time you've misread Chalmers, remember when he corrected you before in the email...?

"'Suggests' through parsimony – not 'said'". It's inferred: as I said, it's a reasonable inferrence from what he wrote. Given two scenarios, where one is simpler than the other, Ockham's Razor tends towards the simpler being the more likely.

Neither Chalmers, nor you, have escaped this fact – and your constant attempts to evade answering this doesn't help your case for idealism either.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
This is not a formal debate – it's a general discussion.

That doesn't abdicate you of the responsibility to think logically. Fallacies are fallacies no matter what.

Your complaint was – and continues to be – "That's not an argument". My point was that this isn't a formal debate – therefore, there's no need for arguments, particularly when you answer with "Nope"/"Naw", etc.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
And given that your "Nope" earlier is good enough for you, no-one else

I didn't just say nope, I gave arguments. Nice try.

Saying, "See the hard problem of consciousness", and opining that, "it seems more like consciousness is fundamental", are not arguments. And I've already dealt with the "hard problem" by pointing out that it has been described as merely a combination of soft problems that are currently being investigated.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Now you are being disingenuous, to say the least.

How is that possible? I was merely correcting you on your mistake in terminology. I'm 100% correct when I told you that eliminate≠reduce. You made a category mistake, don't do it again...

Just because I separated them with a slash symbol does not mean I was equating them. You made an error in pretending I did so that you could evade answering the question. Don't do it again.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
And I'm still waiting for you to provide evidence of a mind independent of the physical.

I already told you the physical is reducible while the mental is irreducible. You really can't put two and two together there...?

And you can't seem to get beyond chanting mantras. We're still awaiting evidence for this claim.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
So, you need to explain how you can reduce or eliminate the physical whilst still maintaining your realist position.

I already have. It's only if you eliminate then you're an anti-realist. If you just reduce then you're not an anti-realist. The reductionist is a realist about the physical, they just identify the physical with the mental. The eliminativist denies the physical altogether and I'm not an eliminativist.

You appear to be confused about usage of terms here.

You appear to be using the term "eliminativist" differently than you've done up to now. You appear to be using it from the perspective of an idealist, rather than that of a physicalist. Either that, or you meant, "The eliminativist denies the mental altogether ...".

Earlier, you said:

... weak emergence and reductionism is on its face obviously false ...

Given that you've also dismissed both eliminativism and strong emergence, this gives you nowhere to go – despite claiming that you're a realist.

Anti-realism is where the truth of a statement depends solely on internal logic. Realism, in contrast, requires that it correspond with an external reality (empiric evidence).

For example, claiming that all you need is a logical argument without reference to the external world (empiric evidence), makes you an anti-realist.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
You keep claiming this but have not provided any evidence for this claim.

Yes I did, looong ago. You seem to have forgotten. I noted how we describe objects using experience and that an object devoid of such phenomenal properties is an object that is indistinguishable from nothing. Go ahead and try to describe to me an object that looks like nothing, feels like nothing, sounds like nothing, smells like nothing, tastes like nothing etc. and you will soon realize that you've described an object that is identical to nothing. There's nothing more to objects than phenomenal properties.

Non sequitur.

What has this got to do with your assertion that, "... the physical is reducible, consciousness is irreducible..."? As I, and others, have pointed out before, you think you're answering our questions but you're not.

Also, if "nothing" can kill you, is it really identical to nothing?

Carbon monoxide, to name but one substance that's indetectable to our senses, can kill us.

Since canaries, like all birds, are extremely sensitive to airborne toxins, they were used as an early-warning system down mines to warn miners of a build-up of carbon monoxide and other gases poisonous and/or dangerous to the miners through their likelihood of causing explosions. Again, a case of "nothing" killing canaries, since they also couldn't detect it with their senses. This practice – having begun in 1911 in the UK – only stopped in 1986 (as an aside, the use of pit-ponies to haul coal out of the mines was similarly only ended in 1999).

Phenomenological limitations may apply to us – or other sentient species – but it does not mean that something does not exist unless we're aware of it. Again, you confuse epistemology with ontology.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
HWIN linked to a video expaining how computer programs are irreducible, yet you have ignored and/or dismissed this.

I didn't ignore this at all, this is a blatant lie. I made a huge response to him and he still hasn't responded.

I said, "...ignored and/or dismissed this.".

In your interaction with HWIN, he noted the following:

HWIN wrote:Monistic Idealism wrote:
Now this is a actual goal post shift.

How is asking you to clarify if you're talking about weak or strong emergence a goal post shift?? If you're talking about weak emergence then they're reducible and that means you agree with me on my points about reducibility. If you're talking about strong emergence then they're not reducible and you're essentially talking about magic. I've made this quite clear and I've stated my opposition to non-reductive physicalism (which entails emergence) all the way from the OP...
It is a goalpost shift for exactly what I already said, and you left on the cutting room floor:


he_who_is_nobody wrote:Now this is a actual goal post shift. You never talked about strong emergence until after people started bringing up that computer programs are also irreducible. You were first saying that mind/consciousness is special because it cannot be reduced. Now that it is shown that some computer programs also cannot be reduced all of a sudden it is not just irreducibly, it is also strong emergence. Now, all of this could have been prevented if you stated from the start that you said mind/consciousness is special because of strong emergence and not just being irreducible, since apparently that is your real argument.

[Emphasis on what you included.]
Amazing just how much you had to cut out just to ask something that was already addressed, no?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Thus, do you grant that I have demonstrated that computer programs can be irreducible?
You have not done so at all. I was merely asking you to come out with it and say you're affirming strong emergence.


Yes I did (in one of the earlier comments you originally ignored). Your goalpost shifting as to whether it is strong or weak is irrelevant to this point. Computer programs have already been demonstrated to be irreducible, which was your original goal.

You haven't properly addressed his criticism of what you said. And I don't see your "huge response" to him, unless you have a different idea of "huge".

Monistic Idealism wrote:
You appear to be ideologically opposed to any equating of human and computer-generated/AI consciousness.

You appear to be retarded then cuz I argued long ago that consciousness is irreducible and strong emergence is false. These are logical reasons as to why AI cannot be conscious.

Your "consciousness is irreducible" claim is still unevidenced.

Seung [2013] explores the possibility of "uploading" our consciousness to a computer system. As he notes:

Enough about the advantages of uploading. Heaven sounds great. How can I get there? Well, that's a tougher question. As I'll explain in this chapter, only one even remotely plausible method has been proposed so far: simulating the electrical signals circulating in the network of neurons in your brain. A computer powerful enough to handle such a simulation could conceivably exist by the end of this century. To propely wire up the model neurons in the simulation, it would be necessary to find your connectome. Right now we can't envision any way of doing that without destroying your brain in the process. That sounds worrisome, but the Christian heaven thing isn'tany better: Getting there almost always requres dying first. And there is an additional bonus to destructive uploading – it eliminates the troublesome question of what to do with your old self afterwards.

For the sake of discussion, let's ignore these issues and simply suppose your connectome could be found. Would that make uploading possible too? Simulating an entire brain is science fiction right now, but simulating part of the brain has been science since the 1950s at least. The models of perception, thought, and memory described in Part II have been formulated in mathematical equations and simulated on computers, of course with goals less ambitious than uploading. The simulations are meant to reproduce a small subset of he brain's functions, as well as neural spiking from neuroscience experiments.

This implies that a computer-system would be capable of supporting a human "mind" – and, if that's the case, there's no reason why it can't support an AI "mind" either.

So, you either have to accept that computer programs are irreducible on a par with consciousness - as HWIN, MGK, I and others have pointed out - making consciousness nothing special; or that, since various aspects (parts) of consciousness have already been modelled on computers, consciousness is reducible – and nothing special.

[Another example of an AI system is Boids, where flocking has emerged.]

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Philosophical arguments are not "proof" in the real world

Actually they are by definition. Proof is proof, Scientism is wrong, stop being a logic denier...

I've specifically stated that science's domain is the real world – not abstracta.

Still waiting for you to show me the scientific experiment to demonstrate this is true. By your own logic you have failed to meet the burden of proof for your claims.

You're attempting to apply deductive logic to the real world, which is properly addressed by inductive logic.

Naw. Logic is logic. Proof is proof. Both deductive and inductive logic applies "in the real world".

Arguments without empiric evidence to corroborate them are no more valid than assumptions, as HWIN has pointed out, and you've rejected.

Remember when you said this?:

Since I'm not an anti-realist idealist, and am a cosmic idealist as I noted long ago, this isn't a problem for me at all. Of course objects are independent of us, our minds, and our perceptions of them, as they are dependent on a cosmic mind that holds all things together in consistency. Simple. No problem here.

"Because God" is not a valid argument.

The application of the Scientific Method is dependent on testability – if you can't test something, then it doesn't fall within the ambit of science: they're unprovable because they're untestable. Anything that's testable is in science's domain – arguments that involve the real world must be corroborated with empiric evidence from testable results.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
You think you have but you haven't.

Naw, that's you buddy.

You have simply attempted to deflect his question by arguing that, if he can understand English, he can't not understand the use of the term "I".

I never deflected, I answered his question and even gave him several scholarly sources to provide even more information to him. If you were being objective at all you would recognize that he's the one who is deflecting. He's making all sorts of claims using the word "I" yet he resolutely refuses to define his own terms. So he presses me to define my terms, but he abdicates himself of this very responsibility which is 100% special pleading. It's a blatant double standard to insist that only I have to define my terms when I make claims but he doesn't. Your tribalism has taken over completely and blinded you to this objective fact... Prove you're not a tribalist and go after him for once.

I, along with others, let this "I" claim of yours slide – that doesn't mean you've answered the question put to you. In my earliest posts I questioned you on this "I". All you had – and continue to have – was a reciprocal "I <=> first person", nothing more. I let it go because it was getting nowhere – Momo666 hasn't, and has shown that you're unable to come up with anything more substantive. You are unable to explain what is this "I" to which you keep referring – your citing the SEP doesn't explain it any better than to say that, "self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that is paradigmatically expressed in English by the words “I”, “me”, and “my”, terms that each of us uses to refer to ourselves as such." "Self-consciousness" is associated with what's termed introspection. As such, "I" is little more than a figure of speech, a label for something – an unproven impression of unity - we can't explain, like the term "dark energy".

Monistic Idealism wrote:
None of which addresses Libet's experiments and the inferences and conclusions drawn from them.

Yes actually it does. None of this shit about Libet's experiment disproves my point about introspection and direct knowledge at all.

Firstly, what I said was:

Momo888 has asked you to explain what you mean by this "I" and/or the "first person" to which you refer. I've raised Libet's experiments in relation to this, yet you haven't answered either of us.

As you – and everyone else – can see, the question was about "this 'I' and/or the 'first person' to which you refer", not "introspection and direct knowledge", as you attempt to portray.

Secondly, actually, Libet's experiments, and the inferences and conclusions drawn from them, do apply.

Since introspection is associated with the existence of a supposed "I", if there's no "I" (Libet, and the others I partially cited), then there can be no such thing as a first-person-related introspection.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Introspection is a key concept in epistemology, since introspective knowledge is often thought to be particularly secure, maybe even immune to skeptical doubt. Introspective knowledge is also often held to be more immediate or direct than sensory knowledge. Both of these putative features of introspection have been cited in support of the idea that introspective knowledge can serve as a ground or foundation for other sorts of knowledge. Introspection is also central to philosophy of mind, both as a process worth study in its own right and as a court of appeal for other claims about the mind. Philosophers of mind offer a variety of theories of the nature of introspection; and philosophical claims about consciousness, emotion, free will, personal identity, thought, belief, imagery, perception, and other mental phenomena are often thought to have introspective consequences or to be susceptible to introspective verification. For similar reasons, empirical psychologists too have discussed the accuracy of introspective judgments and the role of introspection in the science of the mind.

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/

The key phrases being "thought to be" and "held to be" – not "is". And "putative features" is an even more diminishing qualifier of introspection's reliability.

No it's not its just to include the fact that of course there are others who think differently, they're just in the minority like Dennett for example. Those like Dennett deny there is introspection in the first place, so of course we're going to be accurate and say things like "most" instead of "all". Come on man, you can be more charitable than that, you know this...

However, if you actually read the article, you'll find that it questions the reliability of introspection throughout.

It brings up both sides and notes how the majority of philosophers and scientists are realists about introspection. They even brought up how for similar reasons, empirical psychologists too have discussed the accuracy of introspective judgments and the role of introspection in the science of the mind. Notice how the empirical psychologists don't deny the existence of introspection? They question certain features of introspection but they don't deny that introspection grants knowledge like you're dishonestly trying to paint.

You were the one who was trying to paint introspection as unassailable until I pointed out the above phrases.

And psychologists tend to be in favour of the existence of a psyche. In the future, I have no doubt that psychology will be absorbed into psychiatry – or, at least, those parts that are valid, since most of it is pseudoscience.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
sister article

That's not a sister article, that's an entirely different encyclopedia altogether and that same article you're referencing says the exact same thing I'm saying. Read it for yourself. Of course objections are brought up but they are responded to. The majority of philosophers of mind and empirical psychologists are realists about introspection and see it as being on much stronger epistemic ground than sense experience. If you're doubting whether introspection grants knowledge at all then welcome to radical skepticism seeing as how introspection is more direct and immediate.

It's a "sister article" in that it is about the same subject as the SEP one.

I did read it, otherwise I wouldn't have been aware of it in the first place, never mind being in a position to make the comment I did about it. As I said, it is even more questioning of introspection's reliability than the SEP one.

As it notes:

More generally, many of the contemporary arguments offered in discussions of the mind-body problem rely on premises that can only be supported by introspection, or by introspective projection.

In other words, they're untestable because they;re just arguments from personal experience, and, therefore, incapable of being corroborated by empiric evidence, which strikes at the heart of the idea that there can be such a thing as a "first-person science of consciousness".

Monistic Idealism wrote:
Your scientism canard is an attempt to remove consciousness from the realm of scientific inquiry.

Not at all, we just need to get away from reductionism in regards to the mind is all. I'm with David Chalmers here, I'm all for moving towards a new science of consciousness, we just need to break this habit of reductionism is all.

This only makes sense if consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of the brain – not the other way round.

omg how many times do I have to remind you that I'm not a substance dualist? I'm a monist. The fact that meddling with the brain meddles with the mind makes perfect sense in idealism because they're both made up of the same substance. They're both the same thing. It is someone like you who has the issue here since if epiphenomenalism were true then thoughts and ideas shouldn't have any causal traction in the world, but we can clearly see that it does. Thought patterns can change brain chemistry and neural pathways and it is obvious to everyone else that they behave in various ways due to how they think and feel. You're only hope is to explain this away as an illusion, but since introspection and the like is immediate there's no room for that.

So, why are you still claiming that you are conscious – that your mind exists (P1) – if introspection can not be relied upon?

Introspection can indeed be relied upon. You've brought up the same objects everyone else brings against substance dualism, but I'm not a substance dualist lol I never once tried to claim that introspection is infallible, just that it's direct and immediate and is on better epistemic grounding than sense experience. If introspection grants us 0 knowledge then same goes for sense experience and that saws off the branch you sit on since you're trying to rely on sense experience (science) to refute the latter and that's just impossible.

Again, how do you know, given that introspection has been shown to be unreliable?

Introspection hasn't been shown to be unreliable, you've just dished out the same ole shit against substance dualists when I'm not a substance dualist.

This is clearly just your opinion.

That's not an argument. This doesn't address what I've stated at all. What you're talking about by definition is a disorder. I told you before that meddling with the brain meddles with the mind given that they are the same substance so this isn't a problem for idealism at all. Of course brain damage messes with your perceptions, it damages your ability to think properly. Same goes for the DID example. This only shows that something is wrong, not that the self is an illusion or that introspection can't give us knowledge. You're way too used to arguing against substance dualists, I'm not a substance dualist for the last time...

As this is the general case for idealism, if, as you claim, the physical – including the brain - "is really just weakly emergent mental phenomena", then how do flawed minds exist?

Because they're all made up of the same substance. I've told you this loooong ago. If I were arguing for substance dualism this would be a problem for me, but I'm a monist so there's interaction between mind-body.

There are a number of issues in the above that I wish to address.

Your claims that:

1) the empiric evidence – only part of which I cited due to my concern that the post would end up too big to submit – only applies to dualism;
2) Dennett is in the minority;
3) there can be a first-person science of consciousness;

1) The empiric evidence only applies to dualism
What you're forgetting here is causality, and particularly its direction.

In dualism, it's a two-way street; in monism, it's a one-way street.

It's the casting of a shadow: the shadow has no causal effect on that which casts it.

Ignoring neutral monism, as that isn't being discussed, the two possible scenarios are:

a) In mental monism, only the mind is causal: we only speak of mental states, in that one mental state leads to the next;
b) In physical monism, only the physical is causal: we only speak of brain states, in that one brain state leads to the next.

If you're now claiming that there's feedback from the "shadow", then you're rendering both forms of monism indistinguishable from each other, and the "hard problem" unsolvable. Although there are a number of those who believe this - including Nagel, McGinn, Pinker, and Prinz, to name but a few - even Chalmers holds the "hard problem" to be solvable:

The hard problem is a hard problem, but there is no reason to believe that it will remain permanently unsolved.

I'd cited research, particularly Ramachandran (and especially Cotard Syndrome), which showed that the mind is the result of neuro-biology, which you dismissed with this dualism claim.

In a recent study - New study in electric fish reveals brain mechanisms for distinguishing self from other – researchers discovered that the elephant nose fish's ability to distinguish between self-generated electrical fields, and fields generated by others and/or the environment, were dependent on a "negative-image" learned from birth, and perhaps pre-natally. This negative-image was used to filter out internal "noise" generated by the fish, so that it could focus on external sources of electrical fields for communication, navigation, and hunting. If this image was interfered with, the fish was unable to distinguish whether the electricity was being produced by itself or (something in) the environment. It became effectively "blind".

As this species is unable to pass the Rouge Test, there being no "I", it is significant that it suffers the same effect as humans with damage to certain parts of our brains, rendering them (and us) unable to distinguish between self and other. It is hoped that the research will help explain conditions, like tinnitus, which is thought to be due to the brain's inability to filter out internal "noise".

I note this because, as the fish is not sapient (self-aware) as are humans, the fact that it suffers the same loss of identity is significant – it can only be due to neuro-biology being the causal factor, not the mental. Due to the direction of causality, there can be no "feedback" – the evidence supports physical monism, not mental.

In relation to this, you said:

Thought patterns can change brain chemistry and neural pathways ...

Could you cite scientific research that supports this claim?

[I'd like to cite more empiric evidence but this post is already dangerously large – I may confine such to a separate post.]

2) Dennett is in the minority
In The Fantasy of First-Person Science, Dennett notes:

I’m captain of the A team (along with Quine, Rorty, Hofstadter, the Churchlands, Andy Clark, Lycan, Rosenthal, Harman, and many others).

[...]

David Chalmers is the captain of the B team, (along with Nagel, Searle, Fodor, Levine, Pinker, Harnad and many others).

Clearly then, Dennett isn't in the minority – not even amongst philosophers of mind. And when one adds in the hard scientists – neuroscientists, evolutionary biologists, etc, ...!

3) There can be a first-person science of consciousness
And, in relation to the "hard problem", Dennett continues:

He insists that he just knows that the A team leaves out consciousness. It doesn’t address what Chalmers calls the Hard Problem. How does he know? He says he just does. He has a gut intuition, something he has sometimes called “direct experience.”

In other words, an argument from personal experience, which renders a first-person "science" of consciousness impossible.

This is also why Blackmore noted that, if idealism were true, then science is impossible.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
This is ironic, given that, immediately after accusing me of an appeal to authority, you do the very thing of which you accuse me...

sigh I already explained this to you. I'm just using your own logic against it. I'm obviously not for appeal to authority, but you are. I'm showing how, by your own logic, you have to just roll over and accept that you're wrong or else you have to surrender your appeal to authority. Get it?

That's not how it comes across – and trying to reinterpret what you said is rather Trumpian of you.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
I'm saying that you can't exclude P1-P3

Yes you actually can because it is demonstrable through his years of research that he's a realist about consciousness, is against eliminativism, and is for the irreducibility of consciousness. I can cite videos, articles, books, the whole shebang to prove this. We can indeed be confident that he's okay with P1-P3, for goodness sakes Chalmers told us which premises he has a problem with and he explicitly told us P4-P8...

even if you grant P1 the benefit of the doubt, P2 and P3 can not be excluded.

If he grants P1 then he has to accept P2, since P2 is just another iteration of P1. All P2 is saying that P1 cannot be false. P2 merely follows trivially.

Even on this, P3 is not excluded, and I would argue, even if P1-P2 are not questioned by Chalmers, they are certainly questioned by myself and others.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
But of what exactly?

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Introspection: "The two most commonly cited classes of introspectible mental states are attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, evaluations, and intentions, and conscious experiences, such as emotions, images, and sensory experiences."

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intr ... on/#TarInt

As I said in a earlier post, using a sub-state of a unexplained state to confirm/explore/explain said unexplained state is a exercise in futility. None of it may exist if Dennett turns out to be right.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
By this argument, if you're not able to spot an illusion, then you can't be conscious. :|

...what...? that makes zero sense... I'm only noting how it's literally impossible to perceive an illusion if there's no consciousness there to have perceptions in the first place. Please explain to me how I can have illusions if there's no consciousness at all...

Change blindness occurs because we're not conscious.

Dennett had predicted this in his book, Consciousness Explained, which was confirmed by Blackmore's experiments and, later, by others.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
If there's an "I", how can we suffer from Dissociative Identity Disorder - what used to be called Multiple Personality Disorder?

This is no problem at all, they're just delusional. It's not hard to figure out, there's no philosophical paradox here. There is still clearly an "I" that they are aware of, and it exists, they just had a mental disorder which makes them believe all sorts of weird stuff just like any other disorder that causes delusions. No problem.

There's a fragment of an "I", not an "I". That's the point. There's no "I", no single-entity, just a group-entity, due to the various parts of the brain becoming separated – dissociated – from each other, resulting in partial identities.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
And, more importantly, on what are minds contingent, regardless of whether they're flawed or not?

Mind in generally is fundamental. Consciousness as a whole is not contingent. My own consciousness is contingent, but on a cosmic mind which is itself necessary and not contingent.

And what empiric evidence do you have for any of these claims?

Are minds generic? Or, given that the body is a "weakly emergent mental phenomen(on)", are minds gendered – ie, male and female? Why?

Monistic Idealism wrote:
If minds are contingent on the existence of a Cosmic Entity, this suggests that either said entity is cruel/whimsical in creating flawed minds or the Cosmic Entity is itself Flawed.

Never heard of the free-will defense? lol

This assumes there's such a thing as "free will".

Remember Libet? The dualist who tried to show that free will exists but found that the empiric evidence didn't support it?

Perhaps now you'll address "this shit about Libet's experiment"...?!

_____________________________________________________________________________

One last thing I wish to address is this nonsense you're going on with about sock-puppets.

You first raised this in relation to HWIN and my accounts, implying that one of us was a sock-puppet of the other.

I'll repeat what I said then: if you believe that, all you have to do is click on the triangle at the bottom-right of the offending post, and report it to the Mods.

If you're not serious about this, it raises the question as to why you feel the need to raise this notion in the first place!?

Kindest regards,

James
Image
"The Word of God is the Creation we behold and it is in this Word, which no human invention can counterfeit or alter, that God speaketh universally to man."
The Age Of Reason
Thu Jul 19, 2018 5:28 pm
momo666Posts: 135Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:According to you it's "I".

"I" being what exactly ?

You're getting mixed up. Go back and read to get everything in context. The point I'm responding to is your complaint that you need knowledge by description, but I already told you that there's knowledge by acquaintance. Learn to read.

You said: Yes actually, it can. You clearly didn't read that article I linked you on knowledge by acquaintance
I said: I did, but maybe I have missed something. Care to quote where exactly in there does it explain what does the knowing ?
You said:you clearly didn't because this is all spelled out in the article.

So does the article explain what does the knowing or does it not ?

In regard to your other point. You have asserted there is knowledge by acquaintance, yes. But the very concept of knowledge by acquaintance rests upon that which you are supposed to explain. Using that as a reason not to explain this "I" is therefore a non-starter.
Thu Jul 19, 2018 5:32 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

"I" being what exactly ?


That which notices according to you.

Definition of notice: attention; observation.
Synonymous with: awareness, consciousness, perception.

You're literally telling me "I am conscious, I am aware", and that's what "I" is: first person subjective awareness as I've maintained all the way from the OP. It's check mate, my dude... Just admit you grasp the common sense average joe's understanding as you clearly do so we can actually talk about the argument for once, unless you're just that scared... Even Socrates with all his skepticism (all I know is that I know nothing) had the courage to assume another's definition for the sake of argument to at least asses an argument for validity. You can't even do that...? You're clearly being disingenuously obtuse...

So does the article explain what does the knowing or does it not ?


omg read what I write: I keep telling you that you're getting the context mixed up, go back and read. I keep telling you over and over and over that the whole concept of knowledge by acquaintance is that it is independent of any description and your complaint is: "waaah! its not a description!" so you're just missing the point over and over and over again and again... As proven by your own admission: you have self-awareness, you may not be able to describe this very well with language but that doesn't matter since knowledge by acquaintance is independent of any description. I keep telling you this and you just keep missing the point. Please read for god's sake
Thu Jul 19, 2018 6:21 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

If you're not serious about this, it raises the question as to why you feel the need to raise this notion in the first place!?


Why are you so emotional about this...? Why so emotionally invested if its no big deal...?
Quite frankly you're the one raising it right now. This conversation died days ago, you're the one who is resurrecting it. I brought it up because its an interesting and reveals a lot about the character of you guys which raises questions about your judgment. For instance you and momo displayed some suspicious behavior just now. So you guys don't say anything for like days, but you all of a sudden respond to me on the same day within 4 minutes of each other and you're defending him and getting all emotional. come on man, this looks sketchy as hell... I've also brought up the possibility of tribalism which you conveniently ignore every time I've brought it up... If there's no sockpuppetry going on here then there's some hardcore tribalism going on which means your objectivity/judgment has been compromised. You're too defensive of the tribe and unwilling to confront the falsehoods others state which leaves you blind. If you were this objective scientifically minded empirical evidence-based guy you should be more than willing to correct those in your tribe, that's what's done in the scientific community all the time but here you are displaying blatant tribalism (or sockpuppetry).

I've also said before that I'm not into reporting, I think behavior like that is for punks. I'm just into revealing the truth.

The "hand=brain"/"five-fingered thing at the end of your arm=consciousness" pairings were flawed because, although "hand" and "five-fingered thing at the end of your arm" are clearly identical, that implies that "brain" and "consciousness" are equally identical, when you're attempting to argue that they are not.


You're super confused here. You were the one who was arguing for weak emergence, which is reductionism, which is saying A=B. If you're saying "brain" and "consciousness" are not identical then you're moving away from the claims you were making before. But if I do recall you had already moved away from this because you saw the flaws of weak emergence throughout the duration of our conversation before.

This is what happens when you don't quote what people say in full – you only end up confusing yourself, as well as others.


This had nothing to do with quoting and everything to do with your poor choice of words. Your sentence made no grammatical sense... And I already told you, I respond to everything you say, I just have different ways of showing what I'm responding to by not flooding the chat with huge long quotes. Don't bitch at me for not posting the exact same way as you, that's petty as hell... different strokes for different folks, my dude

You are assuming that


No I'm not, I gave arguments and you can't accept this due to your logic-denying worldview.

As I said earlier, all the empiric evidence indicates that consciousness is not fundamental but a result of a combination of neuro-biology and our interactions with others and the environment in general.


No it really doesn't. Even the atheist neuroscience sam harris notes that consciousness is irreducible and he's a realist about qualia contra Dennett. Again, look more into the hard problem of consciousness. I don't think you realize what it means. It's not just a matter of "oh we just need more time" it's a fundamental incompleteness that is within the very framework of physicalism itself hence why Chalmers accepts non-physicalism.

You haven't refuted this - as I've explained earlier, just because there's currently a gap in our knowledege/understanding of consciousness, doesn't mean that there's an actual gap or that we'll never be able to solve the so-called "hard problem". Reductionism is still on the table.


I have refuted this already, all you did was repeat the very claim that I gave an argument against. If reductionism were true there can't possibly be a gap by definition. If they're identical then they're indistinguishable and alike in every detail. Just as there can't be a gap between hand/five fingered thing attached to your arm, there can't be a gap if brain=consciousness. You'll have to surrender reductionism for good.

We still haven't described A yet,


Yes we have. We have identified the brain, we know what it is. We have identified its structures, the chemicals, the molecules, the neurons, etc. There's nothing magical or special about the brain, we can observe it just fine just as we can with any other part of the body. You can point to the brain and describe it and define it and identify it just fine. If consciousness were the same thing as the brain and/or the functions that you identify, then identifying such should identify consciousness by definition. But it doesn't, which means reductionism can't be true.

I'm not claiming strong emergence is the answer – merely that the various possible naturalistic explanations are not ruled out yet, the least likely of these being strong emergence.


You keep jumping back and forth here. Which is it with you? Weak or strong emergence? make up your mind.

They're simply philosophizing


Which means it's logical, so reason compels us to abandon reductionism.

none of which is relevant without empiric evidence to back them up


Why do you keep ignoring my challenge to bring empirical evidence that empirical evidence is the only way to know things...? By your own logic you failure to demonstrate this empirically implies you're full of shit

The onus is on you to name a monist version that doesn't fit into the broad categories I mentioned.


Actually its on you since you claim to have read this and made a ton of claims about it. You make claims? You carry the onus. That's how it works. Don't like it? Don't make claims...

"'Suggests' through parsimony – not 'said'". It's inferred: as I said


The last time you tried to "infer" something about Chalmers he had to correct you. I don't trust your judgment which as been proven to be unreliable by Chalmers himself. As far as I can tell, he's just giving the argument and not actually affirming it. By the way, there are plenty of idealists who argue that we are in a simulation, its just that we are in a simulation in a mind rather than a computer. So your simulation bullshit doesn't actually get around idealism or the case for idealism: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiZLlpqAQ7U

Your complaint was – and continues to be – "That's not an argument".


Yes and rightfully so since you have the onus for the claims you make. You need to give reasons why you're correct, you need an argument instead of a vapid appeal to authority.

Saying, "See the hard problem of consciousness", and opining that, "it seems more like consciousness is fundamental", are not arguments


Nice straw man. I gave arguments on all these matters, you liar...

And I've already dealt with the "hard problem" by pointing out that it has been described as merely a combination of soft problems that are currently being investigated.


And I already gave an argument showing how if reductionism were true there would be no problem in the first place. There can't be a gap between identical things since by definition they would be alike in every detail, indistinguishable, interchangeable, and exactly the same... fail

Just because I separated them with a slash symbol does not mean I was equating them. You made an error in pretending I did so that you could evade answering the question. Don't do it again.


no you literally confused the two, don't do it again...

And you can't seem to get beyond chanting mantras


I didn't give mantras, I gave an argument. proof is proof. Stop being dishonest...

You appear to be confused about usage of terms here.


No that's you since you're the one who thought reductionism as anti-realism... absolute fail

You appear to be using the term "eliminativist" differently than you've done up to now. You appear to be using it from the perspective of an idealist, rather than that of a physicalist. Either that, or you meant, "The eliminativist denies the mental altogether ...".


I used the term eliminativist in the broader sense that one is eliminating, and I noted that eliminating the physical is the anti-realist position you keep complaining about but I'm not an anti-realist. I reduce the physical, I don't eliminate it. So I am a reductionist, but not the way the physicalist is. You need to get your understanding of terms right here, you're way confused.

For example, claiming that all you need is a logical argument without reference to the external world (empiric evidence), makes you an anti-realist.


Actually you being a logic denier is what makes you the anti-realist. Still waiting for you to show me a valid argument with true premises and a false conclusion... you'll soon realize its impossible. This means if I can form a valid argument that has true premises then the conclusion must be true. That's how sound arguments work. If you deny this, you're literally denying logic itself which is far worse than creationism...

What has this got to do with your assertion that, "... the physical is reducible, consciousness is irreducible..."?


Um, can you not read or something...? I just gave you an argument reducing the physical to the mental. That the physical is nothing over and above the mental.

Carbon monoxide, to name but one substance that's indetectable to our senses, can kill us.


The hell are you talking about? Of course we can detect it with our senses, we wouldn't be able to study it scientifically if we couldn't...

Phenomenological limitations may apply to us – or other sentient species – but it does not mean that something does not exist unless we're aware of it.


Nice straw man. I never said anything about it "existing unless we're aware of it". I only noted that there's nothing more to objects than our experiences of them. An object devoid of such phenomenal properties is indistinguishable from nothing.

I said, "...ignored and/or dismissed this.".


And you're wrong about that, I have a huge reply to him. And if this guy isn't you/isn't a member of your tribe then he can defend himself just fine. No need for you to play lawyer for him

Amazing just how much you had to cut out just to ask something that was already addressed, no?


Amazing how tribal you are and how shitty your reading comprehension is. He failed to answer my question yet you say nothing....

You haven't properly addressed his criticism of what you said.


He needs to clarify first. Shut up and let him clarify for himself, he's a big boy/girl. Cool it with the tribalism

Your "consciousness is irreducible" claim is still unevidenced.


I've proven it long ago. Your only hope is to equivocate on the definition of the word proof to mean empiricism/scientism but I already showed how your epistemology is self-refuting.

So, you either have to accept that computer programs are irreducible on a par with consciousness


If you're talking about irreducibility then you're talking about strong emergence, but you keep trying to distance yourself from this. You can't have it both ways. If there's irreducibility, then there's strong emergence. If there's strong emergence, there's magic...

"Because God" is not a valid argument.


Would you stop with the straw men already? It's really dishonest. All I'm showing is there is no contradiction here since there's a cosmic mind to observe it all. Of course the objects we see are still then when they're not looking, but you're assuming that it's not always being looked at. If there is a cosmic mind, then you have to admit logically there is no contradiction here. Even if you don't believe there really is a cosmic mind, logic compels you to admit there's no contradiction.

Anything that's testable is in science's domain – arguments that involve the real world must be corroborated with empiric evidence from testable results.


Key words are underlined here. Science is just science, that's it. For you to say its' the real world is to assume scientific realism and that means you have to justify scientific realism. Btw science won't help you with your attempt at justifying this since that would be to assume scientific realism in the first place, you'd be going in a circle. Which means you're going to have to surrender your scientism, which will then crumble your statements above.

I, along with others, let this "I" claim of yours slide – that doesn't mean you've answered the question put to you


1. how do you know these "others" are letting it slide? Are you them...? Or are you speaking on behalf of this tribe of people that you conspire in the background with...? Pick your poison, neither option looks good for you.
2. You fail to hold momo's feet to the fire since he's failing to answer my question and you don't say jack shit about it like a total hypocrite. He's making claims, he has the onus. That's how the burden of proof works. You can't claim that only I have the obligation to define my terms but he doesn't. That's a blatant double standard, more evidence that your judgment has been compromised. If you're going to press me then press him too you hypocrite...
3. funny how defensive you are of momo, especially since you guys respond so close together. not suspicious at all lol

You are unable to explain what is this "I" to which you keep referring


I caught momo contradicting himself. He's claiming there is this "I" that notices, which is just saying "I have consciousness" and "I have awareness" which is precisely what I'm getting at: first person subjective awareness. He's clearly aquainted (key word here) with this "I". Maybe momo has a hard time putting this into words but that doesn't matter since this is knowledge by acquaintance instead of knowledge by description: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/know ... indescrip/

As you – and everyone else – can see, the question was about "this 'I' and/or the 'first person' to which you refer", not "introspection and direct knowledge", as you attempt to portray.


That's what the "I" is, it's self-consciousness, self-awareness, this direct and immediate awareness. You know how you sense experiences and you're aware of that (don't deny this, you appeal to "empiric evidence" all the fucking time, don't bullshit me...)? Well this "I" is that which is awareness itself, awareness of itself, self-consciousness.

Secondly, actually, Libet's experiments, and the inferences and conclusions drawn from them, do apply.


Just a heads up, most philosophers, including your boy Dan Dennett, is a compatibilist. Which means determinism is not incompatible with free will. Go ahead and use these experiments all day, but you affirmation of determinism doesn't necessarily refute free will as even Dennett notes.

The key phrases being "thought to be" and "held to be" – not "is". And "putative features" is an even more diminishing qualifier of introspection's reliability.


And its thought to be held with good reasons as outlined in the article. The author is clearly trying to be objective, something you know nothing about obviously...

You were the one who was trying to paint introspection as unassailable until I pointed out the above phrases.


The hell are you talking about? I was only noting how introspection is on stronger epistemic grounding than sense experience. If introspection goes out the window then so does sense experience. You can't say awareness of sense experience is perfectly fine yet awareness itself is not. You're sawing off the branch you sit on...

And psychologists tend to be in favour of the existence of a psyche


For good reasons, yes. These are the guys who study the mind scientifically and if you were to go with the flow of the scientific community you would accept the reality of the mind as well.

It's a "sister article" in that it is about the same subject as the SEP one.


That's a pretty loose definition of a "sister article" but whatever...

I did read it


Then I don't see how you're maintaining this dissonance between sense experience being okay but introspection not being okay. Introspection is so fundamental that epistemologists will build on top of it as a starting point. What you're doing is suggesting we get rid of this starting point and just keep sense experience without realizing you're sawing off the very branch you sit on...

In other words, they're untestable


There's that scientism again. Show me the scientific experiment that proves scientism is true. If you can't, then you have to abandon scientism. Don't forget: proof is proof. Let's define proof again, shall we? Proof: "evidence or argument establishing or helping to establish a fact or the truth of a statement."

Arguments=proof. deal with it... Again, show me a valid argument that has true premises and a false conclusion. I double dog dare you to argue against logic itself...

incapable of being corroborated by empiric evidence


Show me the scientific evidence that you have any sense experiences at all. Dan Dennett would say there is none...

In dualism, it's a two-way street; in monism, it's a one-way street.


That's not true at all. If they're the same thing then they both have causal traction in the world since they're actually no distinction between the two. They're the same thing.

It's the casting of a shadow: the shadow has no causal effect on that which casts it.


You're thinking of epiphonemalism, which is actually a form of dualism btw

Ignoring neutral monism


I didn't ignore neutral monism you liar. I noted long ago how neutral monism is actually just idealism in disguise. The SEP even brought this up:
The most frequent type of objection to the traditional versions of neutral monism is that they are all forms of mentalistic monism: Berkleyan idealism, panpsychism, or phenomenalism. The argument is simple: sensations (Mach), pure experience (James) and sensations/percepts (Russell) are paradigms of non-neutral, mental entities. Hence there is nothing neutral about these versions of neutral monism.


Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neut ... /#MentSusp

I'd cited research, particularly Ramachandran (and especially Cotard Syndrome), which showed that the mind is the result of neuro-biology, which you dismissed with this dualism claim.


I've argued that your points about interaction between mind/brain apply to dualism and not monism (which is what I hold to) and that there can't be a gap if reductionism were true. I gave arguments for all this.

I note this because, as the fish is not sapient (self-aware) as are humans, the fact that it suffers the same loss of identity is significant – it can only be due to neuro-biology being the causal factor, not the mental. Due to the direction of causality, there can be no "feedback" – the evidence supports physical monism, not mental.

Could you cite scientific research that supports this claim?


Are you really this unaware of pyschology or are you being disingenuous? A simple google search shows this with no problem: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... connection

I'd like to cite more empiric evidence but this post is already dangerously large – I may confine such to a separate post.


Then perhaps we need to limit our discussion more instead of branching off into like 10 different philosophical issues. This is supposed to be about the case for idealism and its going all over the place.

Clearly then, Dennett isn't in the minority


Your conclusion doesn't follow at all, of course he's in the minority. Eliminativism is a fringe position, the most common objection to it is that its just self-refuting: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mate ... #SelRefObj

This is objection #1, my dude... And this doesn't apply to just philosophers but people in general. Most people are realists about consciousness, they believe there is an "I" that has awareness and thoughts and feelings. This is obviously true to your average human. It's ivory tower types like yourself that get so caught up in language games and unnecessary restrictions (e.g. scientism) that lead you to make ridiculous claims as such.

In other words, an argument from personal experience


You don't realize how self-refuting this is from you. Nobody can make an argument from personal experience if there are no persons and there is no experience lmao

This is also why Blackmore noted that, if idealism were true, then science is impossible.


Nice equivocation. That was for anti-realist versions of idealism, but I'm not an anti-realist remember?

That's not how it comes across – and trying to reinterpret what you said is rather Trumpian of you.


Of course that's how it comes across, you're clearly confused or have forgotten the context. And last I checked Trump won the election when everyone said he wouldn't, so if I'm Trump you're Hillary hahaha

Even on this, P3 is not excluded


Yes it is given Chalmers' work on the hard problem of consciousness and his acceptance of non-physicalism.

Monistic Idealism wrote:
But of what exactly?

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Introspection: "The two most commonly cited classes of introspectible mental states are attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, evaluations, and intentions, and conscious experiences, such as emotions, images, and sensory experiences."

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intr ... on/#TarInt


As I said in a earlier post, using a sub-state of a unexplained state to confirm/explore/explain said unexplained state is a exercise in futility.


It's not unexplained, it's merely known by acquaintance rather than by description.

None of it may exist if Dennett turns out to be right.


That would include sensory experiences, which is on that list that you're now trying to deny, hence you're just refuting yourself. You can't keep sensory experience but get rid of introspection without contradicting yourself.

Change blindness occurs because we're not conscious.


And...? It's still contradictory to say there's experiences with no consciousness. Experience occurs within consciousness.

There's a fragment of an "I"


No there's just a mistaken belief about the "I". The "I" is still there and whole, there's just a disorder going on that meddles with the belief forming mechanisms.

And what empiric evidence do you have for any of these claims?


I gave you proof for this long ago with the case for monistic idealism and how mind is irreducible and strong emergence is false etc.
proof is proof. don't make me define proof again lol

Are minds generic? Or, given that the body is a "weakly emergent mental phenomen(on)", are minds gendered – ie, male and female? Why?


What do you mean by generic? And yes minds are gendered. For the same reasons the anyone acknowledges them as gendered: their phenomenology, behavioral patterns, genitals, chromosomes, etc.

This assumes there's such a thing as "free will". Remember Libet?


This assumes free will is incompatible with determinism.
Thu Jul 19, 2018 8:45 pm
momo666Posts: 135Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

MI, leave me out of your paranoia attacks. Moving on to your claims.
Monistic Idealism wrote:That which notices according to you.

Definition of notice: attention; observation.
Synonymous with: awareness, consciousness, perception.


"That" being what ? What has attention ? What does the observing ? What has awareness ? What is conscious ? What has perception ? How many forms does this question have to take for you to finally admit the obvious fact that you don't have the slightest clue what "mind" is ?

You're literally telling me "I am conscious, I am aware", and that's what "I" is: first person subjective awareness as I've maintained all the way from the OP.... Just admit you grasp the common sense average joe's understanding as you clearly do so we can actually talk about the argument for once

And I'm also telling you that I don't know what is conscious or aware, and given your attempts, neither do you. Yet again you take this "I" for granted. Yet again you don't explain what is aware. Like I said, this belief you parade as an understanding is worthy of being thought up by the average joe.
As for the assertion that I am not addressing the argument, I will only remind you that so long as your argument requires this concept of "mind", my line of inquiry is spot on.

I keep telling you that you're getting the context mixed up, go back and read. I keep telling you over and over and over that the whole concept of knowledge by acquaintance is that it is independent of any description and your complaint is: "waaah! its not a description!" so you're just missing the point over and over and over again and again... As proven by your own admission: you have self-awareness, you may not be able to describe this very well with language but that doesn't matter since knowledge by acquaintance is independent of any description.

Okay, I went back. To my request about what does the knowing and my insistence that I've read your cited article, you said "you clearly didn't because this is all spelled out in the article.". So I'm asking you, where in the article is it explained what does the knowing ?

On to your other claims. Notice that yet again you take this "I" for granted. What has self-awareness ? And of what is it aware of ? Furthermore, what does the knowing ? Notice that this last question of mine perfectly pin points the fatal flaw in your attempted evasion. Your very distinction relies on that which you are supposed to explain. To that end, it inevitably fails as a defense.
Fri Jul 20, 2018 5:14 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

MI, leave me out of your paranoia attacks. Moving on to your claims.


What does that even mean?
What has attention? What does the observing ? What has awareness ? What is conscious ? What has perception ?


According to you it's "I".

Bro, you've painted yourself into a corner. It's check-mate. You've already admitted you are aware of the "I", aware of the self. Maybe you have a hard time putting this into a description but that's okay since this is by acquaintance rather than description.

Okay, I went back.


No you didn't, you're still mixed up. You're complaining that this isn't knowledge by description but I keep telling you this is knowledge by acquaintance. You keep asking for a description for something I keep telling you is NOT description. So you're just ignoring me over and over over again... You're not having an honest dialogue if you're just ignoring what I say and keep acting like I didn't respond to you...

By the way I noticed you completely ignored this: "Even Socrates with all his skepticism (all I know is that I know nothing) had the courage to assume another's definition for the sake of argument to at least asses an argument for validity. You can't even do that...?"

Why dodge this?
Fri Jul 20, 2018 5:53 pm
momo666Posts: 135Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:What does that even mean?

It means that as part of your usual circus of accusing members of using sock accounts, without of course ever taking the appropriate steps that would inevitably show you are misjudging the situation, you have now included me too in your paranoia drenched feces throwing. So I am asking you to leave me out of your conspiracy or have the courage of your assertions and report my account.

According to you it's "I".
Bro, you've painted yourself into a corner. It's check-mate. You've already admitted you are aware of the "I", aware of the self.

According to me, what this "I" is remains unknown. To that extent, what is aware is not known. Notice that yet again you assert "you are aware of the "I"; but without explaining what this "I" is, what is aware of what can not be determined.

No you didn't, you're still mixed up. You're complaining that this isn't knowledge by description but I keep telling you this is knowledge by acquaintance. You keep asking for a description for something I keep telling you is NOT description.


I need not complain about anything, because until you explain what does the knowing, the very concept of "knowledge by acquaintance" rests upon that which you are supposed to explain. So now apart from having to explain what is aware of what, you need to explain what does the knowing. And that was the point I raised to your accusation that I was confused about the context of the paragraphs I was quoting.

By the way I noticed you completely ignored this: "Even Socrates with all his skepticism (all I know is that I know nothing) had the courage to assume another's definition for the sake of argument to at least asses an argument for validity. You can't even do that...?"

Why dodge this?


It didn't seem particularly relevant. What about that would you like me to address ? I need not adhere to any woman or man assumptions. And the definition you have provided of this "I" already takes that which you are supposed to explain for granted. Asking me to assume that attempted definition is just silly.
Sat Jul 21, 2018 5:48 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

It didn't seem particularly relevant.


Oh right, but you butting into someone else's conversation about sockpuppets/tribalism is? You've been caught in yet another lie, momo... Don't make excuses like "I ignored this because it's not relevant to our discussion!" if you're just going to butt into an entirely different and irrelevant conversation because that's a blatant contradiction...

What about that would you like me to address ?


How about the case for idealism since that's what this thread is all about? Could you at least assess it for validity? An arguments validity is independent on the truth of premises, it's just to examine the logical form of the argument.

And the definition you have provided of this "I" already takes that which you are supposed to explain for granted


No it doesn't, you just don't grasp knowledge by acquaintance vs knowledge by description. I've explained this to you and gave you a whole article to read on it that you resolutely refuse to read...

Asking me to assume that attempted definition is just silly.


That's just an excuse to abdicate of yourself of the responsibility to think about the validity of the argument. Stop making excuses.

So I am asking you to leave me out of your conspiracy or have the courage of your assertions and report my account.


Why are you even reading conversations that aren't yours? Before you were acting like you ignored what I said because its not relevant but now you're paying attention to irrelevant conversations that aren't even yours and bringing that irrelevant conversation into our conversation? Make up your mind momo... If you ignore stuff because its irrelevant to our conversation then that means you should ignore that sockpuppet/tribalism convo as well. The cognitive dissonance here on you is stunning


According to me, what this "I" is remains unknown.


No actually as per your own admission the "I" is that which notices, that which is aware, that which is conscious. Again, you're conflating "not knowing" with "not being able to describe". You're just equivocating. You're assuming that if you know something you have to be able to describe it, and that's a purely unjustified assumption on your part. You have acquaintance by our own admission. You said it yourself "I notice x

I need not complain about anything


You're complaining right now. You're bitching because you don't have a description but you already admitted that you have acquaintance. You admitted "I notice x" which means you are aware of the self, that's self-consciousness which is what is meant by "I" as even the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy noted.
Sat Jul 21, 2018 6:16 pm
momo666Posts: 135Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:Oh right, but you butting into someone else's conversation about sockpuppets/tribalism is? You've been caught in yet another lie, momo... Don't make excuses like "I ignored this because it's not relevant to our discussion!" if you're just going to butt into an entirely different and irrelevant conversation because that's a blatant contradiction...

You are misjudging the situation, yet again. You are the one who felt the need to include me in your baseless conspiracy. In case you haven't noticed, this is a public thread and anyone can read whatever comments she/he wants. If you don't want me to take notice of comments of yours that are addressed to other members, then don't include me in them.

How about the case for idealism since that's what this thread is all about? Could you at least assess it for validity? An arguments validity is independent on the truth of premises, it's just to examine the logical form of the argument.

I am addressing said case. The concept of "mind" is important to your argument yes ? How can I assess your argument for validity if I don't know what you claim exists in P1 ?

No it doesn't, you just don't grasp knowledge by acquaintance vs knowledge by description. I've explained this to you and gave you a whole article to read on it that you resolutely refuse to read...

It quite literally does. At no point have you explained this "I". All your attempted definitions merely take it for granted, they do not even bother to explain it. I've read your cited article. And I asked you to show me where it explains what does the knowing. And until you explain what does the knowing, your distinction already relies on that which you are supposed to explain.

That's just an excuse to abdicate of yourself of the responsibility to think about the validity of the argument.

How I choose to address your case is my business. My line of inquiry is very much pertinent to your attempted argument.

Why are you even reading conversations that aren't yours? Before you were acting like you ignored what I said because its not relevant but now you're paying attention to irrelevant conversations that aren't even yours and bringing that irrelevant conversation into our conversation? Make up your mind momo... If you ignore stuff because its irrelevant to our conversation then that means you should ignore that sockpuppet/tribalism convo as well. The cognitive dissonance here on you is stunning

Because this is a public thread and anyone can read whatever she/he wants. And because you are the one who has felt the need to include me in your baseless conspiracy. And that won't change by throwing mud at me.

No actually as per your own admission the "I" is that which notices, that which is aware, that which is conscious. Again, you're conflating "not knowing" with "not being able to describe". You're just equivocating. You're assuming that if you know something you have to be able to describe it, and that's a purely unjustified assumption on your part. You have acquaintance by our own admission. You said it yourself "I notice x

That would at best be what something does, not what something is. What exactly notices ? What is aware ? What is conscious ? Your charge of equivocation is also baseless because you have not explained what does the knowing. Notice that saying that I have acquaintance already takes this "I" for granted. What exactly is this "I" that you claim has acquaintance ?

You're complaining right now. You're bitching because you don't have a description but you already admitted that you have acquaintance. You admitted "I notice x" which means you are aware of the self, that's self-consciousness which is what is meant by "I" as even the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy noted.

That does not explain what is aware of what. It does not explain what this "self" is. It does not explain what has acquaintance. And the reason you continue to refuse to answer those questions is because, obviously, you don't have the slightest idea what you claim exists.
Mon Jul 23, 2018 11:14 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

You are misjudging the situation, yet again


No, you're the one who is simply contradicting themselves. One minute you complain because x is irrelevant to the conversation yet here you are complaining about conversations that aren't even yours and are completely irrelevant... Make up your mind dude... If you want to stay relevant to our conversation then don't say anything about a completely different and irrelevant conversation. It's that simple..

I am addressing said case.


No you're not. Quite frankly you're de-railing this thread trying to make this thread about "the self" rather than "the case for monistic idealism". I've told you before I'm giving a very common sense average joe's definition that even an 18-month child grasps. If you can't even for the sake of argument continue the discussion from here then you need to start a whole new thread about the self because I'm done with this shit. Everyone can understand me just fine, even world renowned philosophers of mind. Fuck off and start a new thread about "the self" or actually address the case for idealism because I'm tired of this repetitive conversation.

At no point have you explained this "I".


You already explained this for us momo. You yourself stated the "I" is that which notices. The I is aware, the I is consciousness. Great. We now have an understanding by your own admission. Tired of repeating this over and over to you. Moving on.

How can I assess your argument for validity if I don't know what you claim exists in P1 ?


omg you have no idea what validity is... Validity is independent of the truth of the premises, it's about the FORM OF THE ARGUMENT. Validity can be assessed purely in formal terms like this: P⊃Q, P, ∴Q. We don't need to know what P or Q means in order to see that this argument is formally valid.. See this is proof you're a total philosophy noob, you don't even have an understanding of logic 101. That's not a joke or an exaggeration by the way, understanding validity is literally logic 101... You're not ready for this level of philosophical discussion, apparently you're not even as developed as an 18-month old child...

What exactly notices ? What is aware ? What is conscious ?


The "I" by your own admission, I can literally quote you directly admitting this... Dude this is getting sooooo repetitive and boring. Let's see if you at least have the courage to address the validity of the argument.
Mon Jul 23, 2018 11:36 pm
psikhrangkurPosts: 153Joined: Sat Mar 10, 2018 3:30 pm Gender: Pinecone

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Hi, I'm gonna go ahead and concede my argument.
Tue Jul 24, 2018 7:37 am
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

psikhrangkur wrote:Hi, I'm gonna go ahead and concede my argument.


Good for you.
Tue Jul 24, 2018 2:31 pm
momo666Posts: 135Joined: Sat Jul 18, 2015 11:25 am Gender: Time Lord

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

Monistic Idealism wrote:One minute you complain because x is irrelevant to the conversation yet here you are complaining about conversations that aren't even yours and are completely irrelevant... Make up your mind dude... If you want to stay relevant to our conversation then don't say anything about a completely different and irrelevant conversation. It's that simple..

I will decide for myself what is relevant or not and this is a public thread, and as such I can address whatever point I wish. On top of that, you are the one who has felt the need to include me in your paranoia attacks. That I respond to such baseless accusations is not that big of a surprise.

No you're not. Quite frankly you're de-railing this thread trying to make this thread about "the self" rather than "the case for monistic idealism". I've told you before I'm giving a very common sense average joe's definition that even an 18-month child grasps. If you can't even for the sake of argument continue the discussion from here then you need to start a whole new thread about the self because I'm done with this shit. Everyone can understand me just fine, even world renowned philosophers of mind. Fuck off and start a new thread about "the self" or actually address the case for idealism because I'm tired of this repetitive conversation.

How am I not ? Is it not the case that this concept of "mind" is required for your case ? Don't throw around baseless insults at me just because I do not follow your pre-conceived idea of a rebuttal. I don't need to start a new thread. I want to know what do you claim exists. And this average joe pseudo understanding is just that, something an average joe would say. I am under no obligation to follow anyone's assumptions, regardless of their status.

You already explained this for us momo. You yourself stated the "I" is that which notices. The I is aware, the I is consciousness.

But notice that in my assertion, I did not explain what does the noticing. I think you've committed a typo of the sorts when you said " the I is consciousness" but be that as it may, you still need to explain what is aware and what is conscious.

omg you have no idea what validity is... Validity is independent of the truth of the premises, it's about the FORM OF THE ARGUMENT. Validity can be assessed purely in formal terms like this: P⊃Q, P, ∴Q. We don't need to know what P or Q means in order to see that this argument is formally valid.. See this is proof you're a total philosophy noob, you don't even have an understanding of logic 101. That's not a joke or an exaggeration by the way, understanding validity is literally logic 101... You're not ready for this level of philosophical discussion, apparently you're not even as developed as an 18-month old child...

You are yet again misjudging the situation. Leaping past your baseless accusations, the problem is much deeper than you demonstrating your premises are true. The issue is that to this day we have no explanation as to what you claim exists. So on what grounds can we deduce that if P1 "would be true" then the conclusion follows if we don't know what P1 claims in the first place ?

The "I" by your own admission, I can literally quote you directly admitting this... Dude this is getting sooooo repetitive and boring. Let's see if you at least have the courage to address the validity of the argument.

This "I" has not been explained. Saying it is "that which notices" does not tell us what it is, it at best tells us what it does. But "that" still remains to be explained. How can you still not understand that there is nothing for me to address ? You can't just wave your hand and say "that exists" and then act surprised when I inquiry as to what exactly you claim exists.
Wed Jul 25, 2018 5:37 pm
Monistic IdealismPosts: 368Joined: Sun May 20, 2018 3:16 am Gender: Male

Post Re: The Case for Idealism

I will decide for myself what is relevant or not and this is a public thread



No, that's not how the concept of relevance works... We can't be talking about a specific topic and you alone get to pick and choose what is and isn't relevant, that's total bullshit... If anyone gets to decide what is relevant around here it's me since I'm the OP. I've already explained OP and have caught you contradicting yourself over and over again and have caught you admitting you understand. Time to address the validity of the argument or fuck off
Wed Jul 25, 2018 5:51 pm
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